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In the first issue of the Clinical Law Review, Peter Hoffman chal-
lenged clinical legal educators to "take skills seriously"1 by producing
clinical scholarship that is "practical in its orientation and design" and
written so as to enhance the ability of lawyers to represent their cli-
ents and to help law students prepare for law practice.2 To Hoffman,
the best clinical scholarship about skills combines theory and practice,
but ultimately is grounded in actual lawyering experiences.3 Finally,
Hoffman insisted, if skills-focused clinical scholarship is to be useful, it
must be written so that lawyers and law students can read, understand
and, above all, apply the analysis provided in that scholarship to the
task of representing their clients.4
This article takes up Hoffman's challenge in the context of exam-
ining the skill of negotiating or plea bargaining from the perspective
of the criminal defense lawyer. I decided to focus on this particular
skill for two reasons. As anyone familiar with the criminal justice sys-
tem recognizes, criminal defense lawyers spend much of their time
"plea bargaining."5 Indeed, the vast majority of criminal cases are re-
* Associate Professor and Associate Director of Clinical Education, University of
Oklahoma College of Law. I wish to thank Peter Joy, Terry Hull and Cindy Foley for their
helpful comments and criticisms. I also would like to thank Koni Johnson and Lori Ketner
for their assistance in the preparation of this article.
1 Peter Toll Hoffman, Clinical Scholarship and Skills Training, 1 CtUN. L. REv. 93, 112
(1994).
2 Id. at 114.
3 Id.
4 Id. at 114-15.
5 Plea bargaining, the negotiating process between the lawyer representing the govern-
ment and the lawyer representing the accused in a criminal case, has been called an "essen-
tial component of the administration of justice .... If every charge were subjected to a full-
scale trial, the states and federal government would need to multiply by many times the
number of judges and court facilities." Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971).
Some critics, most notably Professor Albert Alschuler of the University of Chicago Law
School, contend that plea bargaining is a pernicious practice that undermines constitutional
ideals and ultimately, the legitimacy of the criminal justice system. See, e.g., Albert W.
Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Tria" Alternatives to the Plea
Bargaining System, 50 U. CHi. L. REv. 931 (1983) [hereafter cited as "Alternatives to Plea
Bargaining"]. Most scholars and practitioners agree, however, that plea bargaining is the
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solved by a guilty plea.6 It seemingly would follow then, that criminal
defense lawyers interested in obtaining the best results possible for
their clients would concentrate on becoming effective negotiators.
And yet, despite the obvious importance of being good negotia-
tors, criminal defense lawyers often do not bargain effectively. But
why is this so? Before discussing the methods, approach or tech-
niques that lawyers can use to enhance their ability to bargain effec-
tively, it is critical to understand what it is about the practices of
criminal defense lawyers and the criminal justice system that produces
poor plea bargaining. It is only by understanding the systemic factors
that pressure defense lawyers and defendants to settle most criminal
cases and undercut defense counsel's negotiating strength that law stu-
dents and practicing lawyers will be able to appreciate the difficulties
they will encounter in implementing the approach and techniques de-
scribed later in the article.
The article is designed, therefore, to address a critical need -
improving the ability of those lawyers handling the defense of criminal
cases to negotiate more effectively. As a lawyer and clinician who has
struggled for much of the past 19 years to improve as a plea bargainer
and to train others to plea bargain, I firmly believe that clinical legal
educators are particularly well-positioned to respond to this need. In-
deed, like Peter Hoffman, I believe that clinical legal educators have
the responsibility to explore and debate those aspects or features of
actual law practice that significantly affect lawyers' behavior.
Second, this article was written because each semester I have
struggled to find a good introductory article on plea bargaining to pro-
vide to the students in my Criminal Defense Clinic. Although much
only viable mechanism for resolving the crush of cases that must be processed by un-
derfunded criminal justice systems. See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 14-
3.1, commentary at 68 (2d ed. 1980). Alschuler's article not only forcefully attacks the
notion that plea bargaining is inevitable, he sharply criticizes our present criminal justice
system because it really only provides adversarial assistance of counsel to those who can
afford to pay for quality representation. Alternatives to Plea Bargaining, at 1005. A full
discussion of the merits and costs of eliminating plea bargaining as well as a critique of
Alschuler's proposals is beyond the scope of this article. For a thorough evaluation of the
issues surrounding the abolition or reform of plea bargaining, see UNIrrED STATES DE-
PARTMENT OF JusTICE, PLEA BARGAINING: CRITICAL ISSUES AND COMMON PRACICES
(1985) [hereafter cited as "PLEA BARGAINING"].
6 Commentators generally estimate that over 90% of all criminal convictions in the
state courts in this country are based on guilty pleas. See, e.g., JAMES A. CRAMER, HEINRY
H. RossmAN & WILLIAM F. McDONALD, The Judicial Role in Plea Bargaining, in PLEA
BARGAINING 139 (1980). The latest statistics compiled by the Justice Department indicate
that about 92% of all felony state court convictions are the result of guilty pleas. BUREAU
OF JUsTIcE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUsTICE BULLETIN, FELONY SENTENCES IN THE
STATE COURT 1992, 9 (1995). It is likely that guilty pleas account for an even higher per-
centage of misdemeanor convictions in most jurisdictions. See Patricia A. Smith, Forgotten
in the Courts, 2 CRim. JusT. 14, 17 (1982).
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has been written about negotiation and negotiation theory, little at-
tention has been paid to the application of general negotiation princi-
ples to the plea bargaining of criminal cases. 7 Most of the articles
about plea bargaining are to be found in practice manuals or bar jour-
nals and they refer to negotiating criminal cases as an art8 or a "matter
of instinct" that "defies written analysis."9 These articles provide
pointers and concrete suggestions without any theoretical background
or analytical framework so that the reader is offered some guidance
but gains little appreciation for the underpinnings or rationale for the
suggested tactics. Admittedly, few law students or criminal practition-
ers want to wade through abstract articles on negotiation theory di-
vorced from actual criminal practice.10 This article, then, seeks to
bridge the proverbial gap between theory and practice by providing
law students, lawyers and new clinicians a practical but analytical
guide to the skill of plea bargaining. The article offers an approach to
plea bargaining not only grounded in the theoretical literature about
negotiation strategy but in the realities of criminal practice, client be-
havior and other salient aspects of the criminal justice system.
The article begins by looking at the pressures on defense counsel
and the defendant to plea bargain." Section I is intended to ensure
that readers have the necessary background - in other words, are
sufficiently grounded in experience - so that they can fully appreci-
ate the importance of proper preparation and the significant pressures
lawyers face to shortcut that preparation. The article argues that if
defense counsel does not prepare adequately, she is not meeting her
ethical responsibilities nor likely to achieve much success as a
negotiator.
Before detailing the preparation necessary to effective negotiat-
ing, Section II briefly examines the importance of client consultation
and raises the issue of the need to obtain the client's consent before
plea bargaining. Concluding that defense counsel normally should se-
7 A notable exception, however, is the work of Don Gifford of the University of Mary-
land Law School. See, e.g., Donald G. Gifford, A Context-Based Theory of Strategy Selec-
tion in Legal Negotiations, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 41 (1985).
8 See, e.g., James A. H. Bell, Effective Plea Negotiations In A D UI Case Reduced To
Practical Principles Of Flea Bargaining, THE CHAMPION, April 1994, at 27.
9 See James Douglas Welch, Settling Criminal Cases, in THM LnTGATION MANuAL: A
PRIMER FOR TRIAL LAWYERS 1029, 1033 (John G. Koeltl ed., 1989).
10 Hoffman undoubtedly is correct that much legal scholarship is written in "impenetra-
ble prose" that puts off most lawyers and law students. Hoffman, supra note 1, at 114.
11 Like Jerome Carlin, I believe it is critical "to explore the conditions supporting and
impairing the lawyer's capacity to carry out his ethical obligations." JEROME E. CAR.N,
LAWYERS' ETmcs: A STUy OF THE NEw YORK BAR 4 (1966). Thus, this article attempts
to draw practical lessons from the literature on plea bargaining and on the criminal justice
system as well as from my own lawyering experiences.
Fall 1995]
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cure her client's consent before plea bargaining, Section II next
presents a series of steps the criminal defense lawyer should take to
ensure that she is properly prepared to negotiate a state criminal
case. 12 Proper preparation culminates with counsel's selection of an
approach or negotiation strategy tailored to the specific case she is
handling. To assist that selection, Section II identifies the key vari-
ables that counsel should analyze before choosing the approach to be
used in that case.
Section III then examines additional factors and considerations
that are likely to affect the implementation of counsel's strategic ap-
proach. Although the negotiation dance is a fluid one requiring flexi-
bility on counsel's part, the better counsel has prepared for the
negotiation, the greater her chances for success. Finally, Section IV
concludes by urging defense counsel to engage in a reflective critique
of each negotiating session in order to improve counsel's ability to
select and to implement a successful negotiation strategy.
In discussing defense counsel's role in the plea bargaining pro-
cess, the article touches upon various ethical questions with which
young lawyers will inevitably struggle as they strive to become effec-
tive, zealous criminal defense lawyers. Although in most instances,
definitive answers are beyond the scope of this article, one answer
rings clear. As the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice emphasize,
"counsel's place in our adversary process of justice requires that coun-
sel be guided constantly by the obligation to pursue the client's inter-
ests. Counsel must not be asked to limit his or her zeal in the pursuit
of those interests except by definitive standards of professional
conduct.' 13
12 This article focuses on state criminal cases instead of federal cases for several rea-
sons. First, most law students in a clinical program or young lawyers in practice will be
involved in state court proceedings, negotiating against state prosecutors. Different proce-
dures to a certain extent influence the way plea bargaining is done in the federal system.
More importantly, the impact of the 1987 Federal Sentencing Guidelines on the behavior
of the participants in the federal criminal justice system is so substantial that it requires
separate treatment. For further insight into the extent to which the Sentencing Guidelines
have profoundly influenced the plea bargaining process in federal criminal cases and the
strategies to employ when bargaining under the Guidelines, see PnuLis SKLOOT BAM-
BERGER & DAVID J. GOTrLIEB, PRACTICE UNDER THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDE-
LINES (3d ed., Supp. 1994); Donald A. Purdy, Jr. & Michael Goldsmith, Better Do Your
Homework" Plea Bargaining Under the New Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 3 CRIM. JUST.
2 (1989). See also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTOR'S HANDBOOK ON SEN-
TENCING AND OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE SENTENCING REFORM Act OF 1984 (Nov. 1,
1987).
13 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSICE 4-1.2, commentary at 126 (3d ed. 1993).
[Vol. 2:73
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I. UNDERSTANDING THE CONTEXT: THE PRESSURE TO
PLEA BARGAIN
A. Systemic Pressures to Plead Guilty
Although criminal defense lawyers are ethically required to serve
as zealous advocates and to vigorously challenge the state's case,14 the
vast majority of criminal cases are resolved by a guilty plea worked
out through the plea bargaining process. 15 There is no single or sim-
ple explanation as to why so many criminal cases settle or why defense
lawyers are not better bargainers. A defendant and his or her defense
lawyer may be influenced by a host of systemic forces and individual
pressures to agree to a particular plea bargain. This section explores
the most significant features of the criminal justice system and the atti-
tudes and interests of defendants and their lawyers that affect the plea
bargaining process.
To some commentators, criminal defense lawyers are often indif-
ferent advocates or poor plea bargainers because they primarily care
about resolving cases quickly with minimal effort and little zeal.' 6
Personal interests, not the client's best interests, dictate the represen-
tation provided by such defense lawyers. In his oft-cited work, "The
Practice of Law as Confidence Game: Organizational Co-optation of
a Profession," Abraham Blumberg denounced criminal defense law-
yers as "double agents" who abandon their ethical commitment to
zealously defend their clients and instead "help the accused redefine
his situation and restructure his perceptions concomitant with a plea
of guilty."'1 7 To Blumberg, criminal defense lawyers are double agents
14 See ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (1969) [hereafter
"MODEL CODE"]; ABA MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr 1.3, comment (1994)
[hereafter "MODEL RuLES"]; ABA STANARDS FOR CRIMINAL JusriCE 4-1.2 (3d ed.
1993). As Justice Powell noted:
In our system a defense lawyer characteristically opposes the designated representa-
tive of the State. The system assumes that adversarial testimony will ultimately ad-
vance the public interest in truth and fairness. But it posits that a defense lawyer
best serves the public not by acting on behalf of the State or in concert with it but
rather by advancing "the undivided interests of his client."
Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318-29 (1981).
15 See supra notes 5-6.
16 See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84
YALE L.J. 1179, 1179-1210' (1975) [hereafter cited as "The Defense Attorney's Role"];
David L. Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REv. 1, 8-11 (1973);
David Luban, Are Criminal Defendants Different?, 91 MicH. L. REv. 1734, 1757 (1993).
17 Abraham Blumberg, The Practice of Law as Confidence Game: Organizational Co-
optation of a Profession, 1 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 15, 20 (1967). For others who share
Blumberg's views of the cooperative, non-adversarial nature of the criminal justice system,
see, e.g., GEORGE COLE, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF CRIMINAL JusnicE (2d ed. 1979);
Jerome Skolnick, Social Control in the Adversary System, 11 J. COrLIcr RESOLuTION 52
(1967).
Fall 1995]
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because they use the attorney-client relationship to pressure or "con"
defendants to plead guilty while appearing to work on their behalf.
As double agents, defense lawyers primarily are interested in serving
their own ends - and those of the regular players in the system -
which generally are advanced by disposing of the client's case quickly
without regard for the client's best interests.18
Blumberg undoubtedly is correct that there are criminal defense
lawyers of limited ability, zeal or professional commitment who do
manipulate their clients into ill-advised plea bargains. 19 Some lawyers
do promote their own interests at the expense of their client's best
interest. Moreover, Blumberg's analysis highlights the substantial sys-
temic pressures on criminal defense lawyers to behave in a coopera-
tive, non-adversarial manner. And yet, Blumberg's condemnation of
criminal defense lawyers as double agents sweeps too broadly. There
are simply too many dedicated defense lawyers, too much litigation
and too many other variables affecting client decisionmaking to con-
clude that manipulative, complicitous criminal defense lawyers are the
cause of most plea bargaining.20
1. Defense Counsel's Struggle: Coping With Time and Money
Pressures
Unquestionably, defense counsel's attitude, efforts and recom-
mendation do strongly influence the defendant's decision to plea bar-
gain or go to trial. Some criminal defense lawyers do function as
indifferent advocates. A public defender may be lazy, inexperienced,
overwhelmed by a staggering caseload, burned out, fixated on another
case, distracted by personal problems or affected by a combination of
these factors, such that she shortcuts her preparation and fails to pro-
18 Blumberg, supra note 17, at 22-39. See also MILTON HEuMANN, PLEA BARGAINING
80 (1978) (concluding that criminal defense lawyers eventually succumb to the culture of
the court system, a culture that rewards cooperation but sanctions defense counsel who
adopts a formal adversarial approach).
19 See The Defense Attorney's Role, supra note 16, at 1194-1206; ALAN M. DERSHO-
wrrz, TmE BEST DEFENSE 411 (1982). There are, unfortunately, too many reported ac-
counts of criminal defense lawyers who render inadequate or minimal representation
consistent with that depicted by Blumberg. See, e.g., Trisha Renaud & Ann Woolner, Meet
'EM and Plead 'EM, FULTON CoUNTY DAILY REP., Oct. 8, 1990, at 1 (describing the prac-
tices of Fulton County public defenders to plead as many cases as possible at arraignment
to keep the office operational).
20 For a more detailed critique of the limitations of Blumberg's thesis, see Rodney J.
Uphoff, The Criminal Defense Lawyer Zealous Advocate, Double Agent, or Beleaguered
Dealer?, 28 CRim. L. BULL. 419 (1992). See also PLEA BARGAINING, supra note 5, at 86-
87, 90-91 (concluding that Blumberg and others had "overstated the nonadversarial nature
of plea bargaining"); LISA MCIrTYRE, THE PUBLIC DEFENDER 46-48 (1987) (contending
that Blumberg's criticisms of public defenders have been largely discredited).
[Vol. 2:73
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vide her clients competent representation. 21 Similarly, the representa-
tion provided by retained counsel may suffer as a result of any of
these factors as well as be compromised by that lawyer's personal fi-
nancial interests. 22
The temptation to undercut the quality of representation pro-
vided in order to maximize one's profits or "to chum" cases to turn a
quick fee, of course, is not unique to the criminal defense bar.23
Nonetheless, the temptation and economic pressures on defense coun-
sel are very real.24 The ethical defense lawyer who values her profes-
sional responsibilities will resist the temptation to turn a fast profit
and will provide her clients the best representation possible given the
client's economic situation.25
21 Various commentators have criticized public defenders as marginal advocates who
tend to push their clients into plea bargains to cope with their excessive caseloads. See,
e.g., MARTIN LEvIN, URBAN POLITICS AND THE CRIMINAL COURT (1977); CHARLES E.
SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUsTICE (1978); Michael McConville &
Chester L. Mirsky, Criminal Defense for the Poor in New York City, 15 REv. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 581 (1986-87); David Sudnow, Normal Crimes: Sociological Features of the Penal
Code in the Public Defender's Office, 12 Soc. PROBs. 255, 255-77 (1965). Yet, many of
those who complain about the quality of public defender representation recognize that it is
not necessarily the lack of zeal, of commitment or of ability that plague public defender
offices, but inadequate resources and high caseloads. See, e.g., Richard Klein, The Em-
peror Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the Constitutional Right to Effective
Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625, 661-62 (1986); Suzanne E. Mounts,
Public Defender Programs, Professional Responsibility and Competent Representation,
1982 Wis. L. REv. 473. Nonetheless, numerous observers have reported that defendants
represented by public defenders fare no worse - and sometimes substantially better -
than defendants represented by retained defense counsel. See JONATHAN CASPER, CRIMI-
NAL COURTS: Ti DEFENDANT'S PERSPEcTrVE (1978); McINTYRE, supra note 20; NA-
TIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, INDIGENT DEFENDERS GET THE JOB DONE AND
DONE WELL (1992). See also infra note 26. For an excellent discussion of the pressures
and stresses which make the job of public defender such a challenge, see Charles J. Ogle-
tree, Jr., Beyond Justifications: Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public Defenders, 106 HARV.
L. REV. 1239 (1993).
22 Some lawyers undeniably are tempted to arm-twist their clients to plead guilty to
earn an easy or excessive fee. See, e.g., DERSHowrrz, supra note 19, at 411 ("these criminal
lawyers regard clients the way a department store regards merchandise: the more quickly
turned over at a profit, the better").
23 For a description of the problem in the context of the representation provided by
personal injury lawyers working on a contingent fee basis, see DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL,
LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? 96-112 (1974).
24 As Justice Brennan observed:
a lawyer may have a strong interest in having judges and prosecutors think well of
him, and, if he is working for a fiat fee - a common arrangement for criminal de-
fense attorney - or if his fees for court appointments are lower than he would re-
ceive for other work, he has an obvious financial incentive to conclude cases on his
criminal docket swiftly.
Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 761 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also The Defense
Attorney's Role, supra note 16, at 1179-1241, 1307-13.
25 It is imperative that counsel ensure that each client understands the fee arrangement
and that fee agreements are structured so that clients are not deprived of the opportunity
Fall 1995]
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Public defenders commonly face very different pressures - stag-
gering caseloads and inadequate support - that limit the time coun-
sel has available to provide quality representation. 26 The defendant
who has sat for three weeks in jail waiting to see a lawyer for the first
time may be painfully aware of counsel's limitations. A weary or fran-
tic lawyer scrambling to cope with too many cases hardly inspires con-
fidence in her clients. A client who senses his or her lawyer is
inexperienced as well as overburdened will be even more inclined to
plead guilty and discouraged from pursuing the trial option.
Myths and preconceptions about appointed counsel may further
fuel clients' anxieties. As many commentators have pointed out, indi-
gent clients frequently mistrust appointed counsel.27 A half-hearted
or negative attitude by appointed defense counsel will increase the
defendant's misgivings and encourage the defendant to plead guilty.
Thus, the indigent defender must find ways to reassure her clients
that she has the time, talent and commitment to fight the prosecutor.
The indigent defender cannot rely merely on hurried meetings in the
back of the courtroom to communicate with her clients. To combat
mistrust, defense counsel must schedule office meetings or go to the
jail to see her clients. Above all, counsel must possess and display an
attitude of respect and of concern which demonstrates to the client
that she serves the client, not the state.28
to go to trial. If the client's financial situation is so limited that she cannot afford to pay for
adequate representation, counsel should assist the client to obtain appointed counsel.
26 See supra note 21. Nevertheless, some public defenders do provide quality represen-
tation, especially those who work in programs with good support staff, investigative assist-
ance and manageable caseloads. See, e.g., THE SPANGENBERO GROUP, CASELOAD/
WORKLOAD STUDY FOR THE STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER OF WISCONSIN, FINAL REPORT
(1990); U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, AN EXEMPLARY PROJECT: THE D.C. PUBLIC DEFENDER
SERVICE (1975). Indeed, it is the indigent defendant represented by a contract lawyer or
an assigned private attorney who is most likely to receive substandard representation. See,
e.g., NORMAN LEFSTEN, CRIMINAL DEFENSE SERVICES FOR THE POOR 17-24 (1982);
Uphoff, supra note 20, at 444-45; Welsh S. White, Effective Assistance of Counsel in Capital
Cases: The Evolving Standard of Care, 1993 U. ILL. L. REv. 323, 324-36.
27 Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 761 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). The failure of
many public defenders to devote sufficient time and attention to client counseling and
communication has been identified as a major factor in explaining the fact that many indi-
gent clients have reduced confidence in and are less satisfied with the representation pro-
vided by public defenders. For an extensive discussion of the reasons clients mistrust
appointed counsel, see, e.g., Robert A. Burt, Conflict and Trust Between Attorney and Cli-
ent, 69 GEO. L.J. 1015 (1981); CASPER, supra note 21, at 100-25; MCINTYRE, supra note 20,
at 62-73.
28 This is not to say that counsel's task is easy or that a positive, respectful attitude will
always be reciprocated. Some clients will be impossible to reach. Additionally, the reports
or complaints of other inmates may fuel the defendant's hostility toward or mistrust of
appointed counsel. Counsel's attitude and efforts, however, will convince some clients and
allow her to build needed rapport. For a good discussion of the importance of conveying
to the client in the initial interview genuine concern and a willingness to work for the client
[Vol. 2:73
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Clients are more willing to go to trial with lawyers they trust and
who appear ready, willing and able to go to trial than with lawyers
who evince a lack of confidence, ability or willingness to try the case.
Yet, even zealous defense lawyers need be aware that their presenta-
tion of options and recommendations to their clients may discourage
defendants from going to trial.29 Given the uncertainty of predicting
trial verdicts, the desire to avoid overly optimistic expectations and
the resulting tendency to give cautious advice, combined with the fear
that the defendant will receive a harsher sentence following a guilty
verdict, even well-intentioned lawyers may subtly present their clients
with options in a manner .that influences them to plead guilty rather
than go to trial.30
2. The Pressures on Defendants to Plead Guilty
The decision of many defendants to plead guilty is the product of
a number of individual forces and systemic factors which have little to
do with the behavior of criminal defense lawyers. Indeed, the zeal or
even the availability of counsel may have little affect on the defen-
dant's decision. Simply put, a significant number of defendants just
want to plead guilty. 3' Few criminal defendants, even those who are
innocent, actually want to go to trial.32 Many who are accused of a
as well as helpful suggestions designed to gain the client's trust, see ANTHONY G. AMSTER-
DAM, TRIAL MANUAL 5 FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES § 79 (1988).
29 See infra text accompanying notes 232-33.
30 Experienced lawyers recognize both the uncertainties of trial work and the impact of
such uncertainty on defendants' plea decisions. See, e.g., PLEA BARGAINING, supra note 5,
at 51-52; The Defense Attorney's Role, supra note 16, at 1205-06. Nonetheless, defense
counsel must attempt to make a realistic prediction of the defendant's chances at trial if she
is to provide competent advice to a client who needs such advice to make an informed
decision. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 14-3.2, commentary at 74-75 (2d
ed. 1980) ("defense counsel cannot predict many of these matters with certainty but the
defendant is nonetheless entitled to counsel's best professional judgment"). To make a
truly informed decision, however, the defendant needs more than just vague pronounce-
ments about his or her chances at trial. Rather, counsel should use her best judgment to
provide the client a range of percentages which reflect the likelihood of a guilty or not
guilty verdict. Although percentages will be rough and necessarily inexact, they are more
helpful - and more likely to minimize miscommunication - than counsel's use of terms
like "good," "very strong" or "weak" to describe the client's odds at trial. For a further
discussion of this issue, see DAVID A. BINDER, PAUL BERGMAN & SUSAN C. PRICE, LAw-
YERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT CENTERED APPROACH 337-45 (1991).
31 My experience as a public defender, administrator at a public defender office and as
the director of two clinical programs mirrors the observations of Malcolm Feeley and Al-
bert Alschuler who concluded that the vast majority of defendants in misdemeanor cases
just want to plead guilty to get the case over with quickly. The "process costs" - time,
money and inconvenience - of contesting the charge outweighed the possible gain to be
won at trial. See MALCOLM FEELEY, THE PRoCESs IS PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A
LOWER CRIMINAL COURT (1979); Alternatives to Plea Bargaining, supra note 5, at 951-55.
32 Although the factthat the vast majority of defendants plead guilty does not necessar-
Fanl 19951
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crime do not even consider going to trial a viable option.
Criminal defendants offer a variety of reasons to explain their re-
luctance to go to trial and their interest in a plea bargain. Internal as
well as external pressures may shape the defendant's attitude. For
many defendants, the prospect of actually going through a trial and
having to take the witness stand is very intimidating. Fear, embarrass-
ment, or the risk of adverse publicity drives some defendants to nego-
tiate and to avoid trial. Unquestionably, the risk of a jail sentence or
the prospects of a harsher sentence also deters many defendants from
viewing a trial as a desirable alternative to pleading guilty. 33 For
some, a pessimistic or fatalistic mind-set dampens any enthusiasm for
going to trial. Standing up to the state by taking a case to trial is
similar to taking on city hall, a Sisyphean task few are willing to read-
ily embrace.
Some defendants, of course, have been through the system before
and these prior experiences significantly influence their attitude to-
ward plea bargaining. For some, especially defendants of color, their
perception that the system is heavily stacked against them adversely
affects their view of a trial as a viable option.34 For other defendants,
many criminal cases just do not seem to be "that big a deal" or are
"nothing really to worry about." For these defendants, the time and
trouble it would take to fight a particular charge is outweighed by the
inconvenience the defendant feels.35 It is easier and quicker simply to
plead guilty and to get the matter resolved rather than spend time
ily prove that most defendants are reluctant to go to trial, it certainly supports that conclu-
sion. Again, my experience and that of the public defenders and clinic students with whom
I have worked for the past 19 years is that few defendants are really willing to go to trial.
Even with strong cases involving minimal risk of any negative consequences and no legal
expenses, defendants are reluctant to take any risk or take the added time to go to trial.
Moreover, even experienced clinical supervisors are often unable to persuade reluctant
defendants to set aside their misgivings and go to trial. For a further discussion of the
impact of the defendant's fear of trial on client decisionmaking, see CASPER, supra note 21,
at 68-77. There are, of course, some defendants who badly want to have their cases tried
and who insist upon a trial even in the face of defense counsel's strong recommendation to
settle. See, e.g., id. at 74-76; McIrvEn, supra note 20, at 153-58.
33 See PLEA BARGAINING, supra note 5, at 93-107. Most defendants also believe that
by pleading guilty quickly they substantially increase their chances for a more lenient sen-
tence. See infra notes 41, 56-58 and accompanying text.
34 Numerous studies have demonstrated that defendants of color believe that their race
affects their likelihood of success at trial. See, e.g., PLEA BARGAINNG, supra note 5, at
101. Studies - and my own personal experiences - indicate that defendants are at times
treated very differently because of their race. For a further discussion of the impact of race
on the actors in the criminal justice system, see, e.g., Note, Developments in the Law - Race
and the Criminal Process, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1472 (1988); Symposium on Racial Bias in the
Judicial System, 16 H.AMxiiN L. REv. 475 (1993).
35 This is particularly true of young defendants and those charged with a misdemeanor
or a minor felony. For similar observations, see Alternatives to Plea Bargaining, supra note
5, at 951-55; PLEA BARGAMING, supra note 5, at 101; FEELEY, supra note 31, at 201.
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going to trial even if the charge is baseless or the prosecution's evi-
dence is very weak. Thus, the defendant's attitude about the charge,
his or her other responsibilities and time commitments, financial re-
sources, past experiences and perceptions about the criminal justice
system all affect the defendant's ability to resist the pressure to enter a
negotiated plea.
Some defendants readily admit their guilt and are reluctant to do
anything other than acknowledge responsibility for the crime or
crimes committed.36 Sometimes this reaction is fed by the defendant's
religious or moral feelings. In other instances, the defendant's "get it
over with" attitude is spurred on by concerns that contesting a charge
will have a negative effect on the defendant's family, financial situa-
tion or employment status.37 Such defendants may be unaware of or
fail to consider the long-term consequences of a hasty decision to
plead guilty. 38
It may be very appropriate for the lawyer to push the defendant
to fight a weak charge rather than merely accede to the defendant's
get-it-over-with attitude.39 At some point, of course, the lawyer's
pushing or leaning hard becomes inappropriately coercive.40 Consci-
entious defense counsel will seek through appropriate counseling to
prod her clients to take a broader view of their best interests.
Many defendants, especially those who have already been
through the system, recognize that the criminal justice system encour-
ages the resolution of cases through plea bargaining. The prospect of
securing a more lenient sentence, in fact, drives many defendants to
want to plead guilty.41 The defendant who received a significant
36 This is especially so when the defendant is truly remorseful or recognizes that she has
no realistic prospect of an acquittal. See, e.g., Alternatives to Plea Bargaining, supra note 5,
at 944, 950; PLEA BARGAINING, supra note 5, at 102.
37 The Supreme Court acknowledged that such pressures do drive defendants to plead
guilty, but found that such factors do not make the pleas coerced or involuntary. See
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750 (1970).
38 Although future job prospects, insurance rates or licensing options may seem unim-
portant to the client now, a good lawyer should draw the client's attention to the potential
adverse consequences of a guilty plea. See infra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
39 See, e.g., Abbe Smith, Rosie O'Neill Goes to Law Schoo" The Clinical Education of
the Sensitive New Age Public Defender, 28 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 31 (1993) ("some-
times respect for clients means leaning hard on them to do the right thing"). See also ABA
STANDARDS FOR CRimiNAL JusTicE 4-5.2, commentary at 201 (3d ed. 1993) ("although it is
highly improper for counsel to demand that the defendant follow what counsel perceives as
the desirable course or for counsel to coerce a client's decision through misrepresentation
or undue influence, counsel is free to engage in fair persuasion and to urge the client to
follow proffered professional advice").
40 See infra notes 234-37 and accompanying text.
41 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742,756 (1970). Empirical evidence seemingly con-
firms the widely held view that defendants who go to trial tend to be sentenced more
harshly than those who plead guilty to the same type of offense, although the degree of
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break in an earlier case may be particularly anxious to enter into a
plea bargain. Or the defendant may be savvy enough to know that it
is advantageous to deal quickly with the police or prosecutor before
other potential defendants or co-conspirators do.42 Indeed, a lawyer
bent on finding the facts in an initial interview may be brusquely in-
structed or directed by a seasoned defendant just to "cut a deal."
One of the difficult problems that new lawyers face in dealing
with experienced defendants is that these defendants may be quite
knowledgeable - and even more frequently, think they are very
knowledgeable - about the plea bargaining process. This can be par-
ticularly intimidating for the inexperienced defense attorney. The fact
that the defendant got a deal in a somewhat similar case in another
jurisdiction or at an earlier time may create unreal expectations about
counsel's ability to secure a particular deal in this instance. The de-
fendant also may lament that her proffered bargain is not as good as
the deal her friend received. As every lawyer knows, individual facts
and circumstances change the outcome of a case. Explaining this to a
defendant who believes she has all the answers, however, can be par-
ticularly challenging. Defense counsel who can convince her clients
that she is, in fact, working on their behalf, is likely to be more suc-
cessful in persuading her clients to agree to plea bargains that are in
their best interests and to refuse to accept poor deals.
Notwithstanding counsel's advice, it is often the defendant, not
the so-called "double agent" defense lawyer, who is insistent on work-
differential sentencing practices varies by jurisdiction. PLEA BARGAINING, supra note 5, at
93-107. It is difficult to determine, however, if judges are punishing those who go to trial
or simply rewarding those who plead guilty. Judges seldom acknowledge that they punish
anyone for going to trial, but will admit that they will give a more lenient sentence to a
person who pleads guilty. Id. For a critical discussion of the judicial practice of rewarding
defendants who plead guilty by sentencing them less severely than those convicted at trial,
see Alternatives to Plea Bargaining, supra note 5, at 963, 978-94; Albert W. Alschuler, The
Trial Judge's Role in Plea Bargaining (Part 1), 76 COLUM. L. REv. 1059, 1976-87 (1976).
42 In some circumstances, the first defendant to cooperate may gain considerable con-
sideration from the state. See AMSTERDAM, supra note 28, § 208. As has been widely
reported, the federal government's war on drugs has spawned a tremendous increase in the
number of informants, the vast majority of whom are helping authorities to obtain a dis-
missal or reduction of their own charges. See, e.g., Peter Katel, Justice: The Trouble with
Informants, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 30, 1995, at 48. Not surprisingly, then, a sizeable number of
defendants not only are interested in exploring this alternative, but also realize the impor-
tance of getting to the prosecutor first. Nevertheless, counsel may find herself in an ex-
tremely tricky position trying to negotiate a cooperation agreement when she has had little
time to investigate or discover what the prosecutor really knows. The prosecutor's posi-
tion, however, may be equally tricky. See United States v. Mezzanatto, 115 S.Ct. 797, 804
(1995) (recognizing the "painfully delicate" choices prosecutors face during the early
stages of criminal investigations when they may be willing to offer immunity or leniency at
sentencing in exchange for information). For a closer look at cooperation agreements, see
Graham Hughes, Agreements for Cooperation in Criminal Cases, 45 VAND. L. REv. 1
(1992).
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ing out a plea bargain. In many cases defendants simply recognize
that our overburdened criminal justice system has been structured to
discourage them from going to trial. Too few criminal defendants can
really afford to pay the cost of mounting an effective defense.43 In
some jurisdictions, access to appointed counsel, the quality of indigent
defenders and the resources provided to support the defense of the
indigent affect the extent to which defendants have a meaningful right
to go to trial." The unrepresented defendant or the accused able to
scrape up only a minimal retainer faces substantial pressure to plead
guilty.45 Take, for example, the defendant who has used his last $500
to bail himself out and to retain counsel. His lawyer threatens to with-
draw unless the defendant pays an additional $2000 for a trial. Rather
than fight the charge, the defendant pleads guilty to save the $2000
fee. Or he accepts the proffered plea bargain because he simply can-
not raise any more money. Thus, economic pressures often eliminate
the criminal defendant's right to trial as a viable option.46
Those pressures intensify for the defendant who is held in jail un-
able to make bail. Many defendants, especially first offenders, will
43 The Florida Supreme Court observed that "[t]he relationship between an attorney's
compensation and the quality of his or her representation cannot be ignored," White v.
Board of Country Comm'rs, 537 So.2d 1376, 1380 (Fla. 1989), an observation echoed by
many courts and scholars. See, e.g., Alternatives to Plea Bargaining, supra note 5, at 1005;
The Defense Attorney's Role, supra note 16, at 1179-1204. The O.J. Simpson case dramati-
cally illustrates that point. See John H. Laugbein, Money Talks, Clients Walk, NEWSWEEK,
April 17, 1995, at 32-34. For a detailed examination of the dramatic disparity in the quality
of representation provided capital defendants, see White, supra note 26.
4 Numerous reports and articles have detailed the serious deficiencies in the delivery
of indigent defense services in many jurisdictions throughout the United States. See, e.g.,
SPECIAL COMM. ON CRiMNAL JUSTICE N FREE Soc'Y, CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECrION, CRIM-
NAL JusTcE IN CRisis (1988). For a closer look at the extent to which the local structure
for delivering indigent defense services affects the decisions of indigent defendants and the
overall quality of representation in a jurisdiction, see Uphoff, supra note 20, at 443-56.
45 Numerous commentators have condemned the quality of representation provided by
courthouse "hacks" who specialize in the quick plea. See, e.g., Bazelon, supra note 16, at
8-11; The Defense Attorney's Role, supra note 16, at 1179-98.
46 A defendant charged with the delivery of a controlled substance called me recently
and asked if he could be represented by our clinical program. He was out on bail and
managed to scrounge up $500 to pay an inexperienced, young attorney to represent him.
He was dissatisfied with the lawyer because the lawyer wanted him to plead guilty and the
client insisted he was innocent. I explained to him the reasons we could not accept his case
and that it was unlikely that he would be deemed indigent and provided appointed counsel
because he was out on bail and had already retained counsel. He was out of money and
really out of viable options, except, of course, to plead guilty. Not surprisingly, he did. For
discussion of the extent to which systemic hurdles in obtaining appointed counsel, includ-
ing a narrow definition of indigency, can restrict an accused's right to effective representa-
tion, see Rodney J. Uphoff, The Right to Appointed CounseL" Why Defendants in
Oklahoma Still Are Unrepresented, 64 OKLA. B.J. 918 (1993). For a further discussion of
the degree to which financial impediments and limitations restrict defendants' access to a
fair trial, see The Defense Attorney's Role, supra note 16, at 1200-04.
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agree to almost anything to get out of jail. It is all too common for
defendants to enter a guilty plea merely as the quickest means to se-
cure their release from jail.47 Accordingly, defense counsel's ability to
secure her client's release on bond is likely to minimize pressure on
the defendant to agree to a poor plea bargain, thereby significantly
improving counsel's negotiating position.
3. Judicial and Prosecutorial Pressures
Both trial judges and appellate courts contribute to the systemic
pressure on defendants to plea bargain. Judges are increasingly under
fire by the public and state legislators who clamor for tougher
sentences and an end to the "coddling" of criminals. Trial judges,
many of whom are elected, cannot grant defendants too many sen-
tencing concessions without being labeled "soft on crime." Yet, over-
flowing court dockets and prison overcrowding create conflicting
pressure on judges to move cases efficiently while still imposing tough
sentences." Plea bargaining enables trial judges to resolve large num-
bers of cases in an orderly, timely fashion that would not be possible if
more cases actually went to trial.49
Criminal defendants also are discouraged from challenging ques-
tionable rulings on suppression issues or taking marginal cases to trial
because appellate review often is a lengthy process in which defen-
dants enjoy only limited success. 50 In addition, the expanded applica-
tion of the harmless error doctrine, 51 the diminution of the
47 A number of studies demonstrate that bail practices exert considerable pressure on
criminal defendants to enter guilty pleas, especially if the defendant's inability to make bail
is coupled with a delay in the appointment of counsel. See, e.g., Uphoff, supra note 20, at
437-39; Gerald R. Wheeler & Carol L. Wheeler, Reflections on Legal Representation of the
Economically Disadvantaged. Beyond Assembly Line Justice, 26 CRHIE & DELINQ. 319
(1980); HANS ZEISEL, THm LIMrrs OF LAw ENFORcEmENT 47-49 (1982).
48 See Albert W. Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct By Prosecutors and Trial Judges, 50
TEx. L. REv. 629, 679 (1972) ("many trial judges seem to have become as preoccupied with
'moving cases' as traffic police are with moving vehicles") [hereafter cited as "Courtroom
Misconduct"].
49 See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971); PLEA BARGAINING, supra
note 5, at 93-107. But see Alternatives to Plea Bargaining, supra note 5, at 931-1011 (argu-
ing that plea bargaining unnecessarily distorts case outcomes and undermines entire crimi-
nal justice system, thereby warranting substantial systemic changes).
50 In Oklahoma, for example, indigent defendants have had to wait three or more years
before a brief was even filed in their behalf on their direct criminal appeal. Harris v.
Champion, 15 F.3d 1538, 1546 (10th Cir. 1994). Even after this lengthy wait, the odds that
the defendant's conviction will be overturned are slim. From January 1, 1993 until October
16, 1994, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals handled over 2,003 cases and affirmed
approximately 95% of them. Telephone interview with Elizabeth Bridgers, Secretary for
the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (May 8, 1995).
51 Commentators have decried the willingness of the courts to use the harmless error
doctrine to affirm convictions despite the real possibility the verdict was compromised.
See, e.g., Bennett L. Gershman, Symposium The New Prosecutors, 53 U. Prrr. L. REv.
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exclusionary rule,52 the narrowing of the scope of federal habeas
corpus relief53 and the difficulty of showing ineffective assistance of
counsel5 also encourage defendants to settle their cases. The
message sent to defendants and defense lawyers, whether intended or
not, is to cooperate and not litigate.55
Trial judges send a similar message to defendants contemplating a
trial: go to trial and if you lose, you will get a stiffer sentence.56 Even
if the defendant is initially unaware of this reality, defense counsel
when discussing the defendant's options usually will raise this consid-
eration.5 7 The uncertainty of success at trial, combined with the real
393, 424-31 (1992).
52 See, e.g., Lewis R. Katz, In Search of a Fourth Amendment for the TWenty-First Cen-
tury, 65 IND. L.J. 549 (1990).
53 For an overview of the extent to which the Supreme Court has restricted federal
habeas corpus relief, see JAMES S. LIEBMAN & RANDY HERTz, FEDERAL HABEAS CoRPUS
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 641-48 (2d ed. 1994).
54 For an extended discussion of the limitations of the Strickland v. Washington stan-
dards as a basis for evaluating reasonably competent representation or as a means to im-
prove the substandard representation afforded many capital defendants, see White, supra
note 26.
55 This is not to say that defendants generally pay serious attention to the possibility of
appellate review in making the decision to plead guilty or go to trial. In some cases, how-
ever, they do. It is the unusual case in which a criminal defense lawyer can advise a client
when assessing the risk of trial to place much stock on the likelihood of favorable appellate
review should the trial be lost.
56 See supra note 41. Generally, a trial judge is forbidden from suggesting to a defen-
dant that he or she is likely to receive a heavier sentence after trial because of the coercive
impact of such a suggestion. See, e.g., United States v. Corbitt, 996 F.2d 1132, 1134-35
(l1th Cir. 1993); United States v. Barrett, 982 F.2d 193 (6th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Bruce, 976 F.2d 552, 555-58 (9th Cir. 1992). Standard 14-1.8 of the ABA Standards for
Criminal Justice states that a judge should not impose any additional punishment on a
defendant simply because that defendant chooses to go to trial instead of pleading guilty.
The commentary to Standard 14-1.8(b) draws upon caselaw to support the contention that
it is appropriate to give a defendant who is convicted at trial a harsher sentence based on
accepted penological principles, but not to mete out extra punishment merely for going to
trial. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 14-1.8, commentary at 49 (2d ed. 1980).
Proving that a defendant was punished for going to trial, however, is an extremely difficult
task. Cf. Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 223 (1987) (constitutionally permissible to
compel defendant to choose between possible leniency by pleading guilty and a harsher
sentence if the defendant goes to trial).
57 The perception among criminal defendants that they would receive a more severe
sentence if they go to trial is "almost universal." PLEA BARGAINING, supra note 5, at 100-
02. This perception may be based on advice of counsel or the product of comments made
by police officers or fellow inmates. Although the extent to which sentencing practices
bear out this common perception varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, the perception
clearly influences a large number of defendants to plead guilty. Id. at 97-101. In fact,
research suggests that most defendants plead guilty because they fear a harsher punish-
ment if they go to trial. Id. at 93-107, 132. There are, however, some judges and certain
cases where the defendant can, in fact, exercise the right to trial without risk of a harsher
penalty. A good advocate who knows a judge's temperament and sentencing practices may
urge a defendant to take a case to trial because the prosecutor's final offer is so harsh that
the defendant can safely risk trial without incurring a worse sentence.
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prospect of a harsher penalty should the defendant lose, makes the
trial option for many defendants a risky gamble.58 Thus, the defen-
dant's fear of jail not only may seriously undercut counsel's ability to
project a credible threat to go to trial, but also cripple the client's will
to hold out for a better bargain.
Like their indigent defender counterparts, most prosecutors' of-
fices lack sufficient resources to adequately investigate, prepare and
try many cases. 59 Prosecutors, therefore, also are subject to considera-
ble pressure to settle the vast majority of cases. Unlike defense law-
yers, however, prosecutors retain considerable power and discretion
in determining when cases are brought, which cases are dismissed or
pushed and how cases are ultimately settled.60 Courts have given
prosecutors broad latitude both in the charging decision and in the
bargaining process.61 The prosecutor often can select from a wide
range of potential charges growing out of any criminal episode, which
permits the prosecutor to charge one or multiple counts. 62 In addi-
tion, prosecutors generally are free to offer concessions or to threaten
additional punishment to force defendants to accept some negotiated
deal. Prosecutors are well aware of the allure of a "no jail" recom-
mendation and use it frequently to entice a defendant into a guilty
58 The uncertainty of trial may be even greater in a state like Oklahoma where the jury
imposes the sentence, see OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 926 (1991), making it even harder for
defense counsel to provide a reasonable prediction of the consequences of a guilty verdict.
59 Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971).
60 A host of cases trumpet the considerable authority vested in the prosecutor in the
American criminal justice system. See, e.g., United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114
(1979) (permitting prosecutor to choose between different statutory penalty schemes appli-
cable to the same conduct); United States v. Stanley, 928 F.2d 575 (2d Cir. 1991) (prosecu-
tor has broad discretion to use additional firearm charge in effort to dissuade defendants
from going to trial). For an excellent summary of the scope of prosecutorial discretion, see
WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 559-94 (1985).
61 Unquestionably the prosecutor in the American criminal justice system occupies a
position of extraordinary power with wide discretion subject to little review. See ABA
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 3-1.1 (3d ed. 1993). For a critical examination of the
broad extent of prosecutorial power, see Gershman, supra note 51, at 393-458. In addition,
courts have afforded prosecutors wide latitude in the bargaining process. See, e.g.,
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978) (prosecutor could properly carry out threat to
prosecute defendant as habitual offender despite fact that threat was used to attempt to
coerce defendant to plead to underlying felony).
62 Many commentators complain that prosecutors regularly abuse their charging power
to overstate the defendant's criminal conduct and to enhance their negotiating leverage.
See, e.g., Gershman, supra note 51, at 405-09; Seymour Glanzer & Paul R. Taskier, For
Both the Experienced and Neophyte Criminal Lawyer - The Fine Art of Plea Bargaining,
CRIm. JUST. (Summer 1987) at 7. See also ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 3-3.9,
commentary at 77 (3d ed. 1993) ("The line separating overcharging from the sound exer-
cise of prosecutorial discretion is necessarily a subjective one, but the key consideration is
the prosecutor's commitment to the interests of justice, fairly bringing those charges he or
she believes are supported by the facts without 'piling on' charges in order to unduly lever-
age an accused to forego his or her right to trial.").
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plea in a marginal case,63 especially if the offer includes a reduction to
a misdemeanor charge. Because a prosecutor's sentencing recommen-
dations are readily accepted by most judges and the prosecutor is
vested with virtually unfettered charging discretion, it is the prosecu-
tor who really is in the position to dictate the level of punishment
meted out to most defendants.
This is not to say, however, that the outcome or resolution of a
criminal case in a jurisdiction is largely unaffected by the behavior and
attitude of the judge handling the case. The personality and philoso-
phy of the trial judge do matter.64 The judge's scheduling practices,
bail policies, motion and trial rulings and sentencing proclivities all
influence the extent to which defendants and their lawyers perceive a
jury trial as a viable option and, in turn, the inclination of defendants
to select that option instead of agreeing to a plea bargain.
Nonetheless, it is the prosecutor, not the judge, who really con-
trols the outcome of most criminal cases.65 Prosecutors are not un-
mindful of their power. Certainly there are many prosecutors who
attempt to wield this power in a fair and even-handed way.66 There
are other prosecutors, however, who make it very clear to defense
lawyers that those lawyers who do not "play ball" with the prosecu-
tor's office will pay a price.67 Or, to put it more accurately, their cli-
ents will pay a price.
63 See also PLEA BARGAINING, supra note 5, at 80. As Professor Alschuler observed,
"[d]efendants who sensed even a slight possibility of conviction at trial usually found the
prosecutor's offers irresistible." Alternatives to Plea Bargaining, supra note 5, at 1032. In
Oklahoma, for example, prosecutors in Cleveland County routinely offer to first offenders
to recommend a deferred sentence in exchange for a plea, especially if the state has proof
problems. If the defendant completes the deferred period and meets all of the conditions
of her deferred sentence - the most important of which is not committing any new of-
fenses - the defendant's case is dismissed and expunged. If, however, the defendant com-
mits a new crime, her deferred sentence is accelerated and she may then be sentenced up
to the maximum provided by law. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 991(c) (Supp. 1994). It is
difficult for a defendant to turn down a proffered deferred sentence and go to trial, thereby
risking a conviction and harsher punishment, even though the defendant has a very strong
defense or the state's case is weak.
64 See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 14-1.8, commentary at 44-45 (2d ed.
1980) (acknowledging that broad judicial sentencing discretion increasingly has been re-
stricted but noting that judges still retain considerable discretion to increase or decrease a
defendant's sentence). See also AMSTERDAM, supra note 28, § 217.
65 Other commentators echo this observation. See, e.g., Gershman, supra note 51, at
405-24; PLEA BARGAINING, supra note 5, at 14.
66 See Gershman, supra note 51, at 456 (despite serious systemic problem of
prosecutorial misconduct, many prosecutors "behave with consummate fairness"); PLEA
BARGAINING, supra note 5, at 51-60 (reporting the views of many prosecutors that
overcharging and the use of "Bordenkircher tactics," see supra note 61, are generally im-
proper and inconsistent with fair play).
67 See, CASPER, supra note 21, at 136; DERSHOwrrz, supra note 19, at 401-02;
HEuMANN, supra note 18, at 61-69.
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B. Resisting the Pressure to Conform
The culture in any particular criminal justice system ultimately
influences how plea bargaining is conducted in that jurisdiction and
how many cases actually go to trial. If in a particular jurisdiction few
defense lawyers fie motions or take cases to trial, the pressure on
other defense lawyers and defendants to follow suit is much greater
than in a jurisdiction in which defendants regularly exercise their right
to go to trial. A defense lawyer in a jurisdiction in which prosecutors
rarely have to make any concessions because few cases are tried may
find it more difficult to extract reasonable concessions from the prose-
cutor, even though the state's case is weak, than defense counsel in a
county with a vigorous defense bar. The prosecutor in a county with a
timid defense bar may single out the more zealous defense lawyer and
refuse to provide her clients the kind of concessions generally pro-
vided the more pliant defense lawyers. 68 Defense counsel who stands
up to fight in one case may be concerned that the prosecutor will take
it out on her other clients.
The ethical rules69 and ABA Standards70 both mandate that de-
fense counsel cannot compromise the representation of one client in
order to serve the interests of other clients. Defense counsel is ethi-
cally bound to fight zealously on behalf of a client even though coun-
sel's stance and efforts may irritate or offend a prosecutor who has the
power to affect the disposition of counsel's other cases. Defense
counsel bargaining with a vindictive prosecutor or in a culture where
counsel's own zeal is contrasted with the lack of zeal of others, how-
ever, cannot help but experience the tension created in such a situa-
tion.71 It is easy to say that the lawyer's responsibility in that situation
68 See Gifford, supra note 7, at 80 (noting that prosecutors punish attorneys who they
deem to be too adversarial - defense lawyers, for example, who conduct a vigorous mo-
tion practice - by refusing to grant typical plea bargaining concessions to these attorneys'
clients).
69 See MODEL CODE DR 5-106, DR 7-101(A)(1); MODEL RULES 1.7, 1.9.
70 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRmNA1 JusrcE 4-6.2(d) (3d ed. 1993) ("defense counsel
should not seek concessions favorable to one client by any agreement which is detrimental
to the legitimate interests of a client in another case"). See also ABA STANDARDS FOR
CRimiNAL JusTcE 4-3.5, commentary at 162 (3d ed. 1993) ("The professional judgment of
a lawyer should be exercised, within the bounds of law, solely for the benefit of his or her
client and free of any compromising influences and loyalties. The lawyers' own interests
should never be permitted to have an adverse effect on representation of a client.").
71 See, e.g., Ted Schneyer, Sympathy for the Hired Gun, 41 J. L. EDUC. 11, 24 (1991)
(recognizing that the pressure to avoid antagonizing prosecutors with tremendous discre-
tion produces "plea bargains too easily accepted by one-shot clients on the advice of law-
yers trying either out of self-interest or for the good of their clients as a class, to maintain
good personal relations with the judges and prosecutors with whom they must regularly
work") (emphasis in original). See also Klein, supra note 21, at 669-73; DERSHOwrrZ,
supra note 19, at 404-05.
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is to zealously defend the interests of the individual client even though
it may make the lawyer's own practice more difficult and adversely
affect her future plea bargains. And yet, defense counsel who is
weighing whether to stand up to a prosecutor may feel very vulnerable
and legitimately concerned about the impact of doing so.72 Nonethe-
less, lawyers who cave in to this pressure and undercut their represen-
tation to one client out of fear of prosecutorial retaliation ultimately
are doomed to be marginal advocates, forced to accept whatever dis-
position the prosecutor dictates.
For some criminal defense lawyers this dilemma poses no diffi-
culty. Some criminal defense lawyers simply are unwilling to do what
it takes to be ready to take on a prosecutor on behalf of a client.73
Such defense lawyers rarely bother to investigate or to prepare be-
cause they see no need; going to trial will never be an option. Defense
counsel's job merely is to broker a deal. Plea bargaining means going
to see the prosecutor and finding out the state's offer, so little prepa-
ration is required. To such lawyers, being a good negotiator in crimi-
nal cases involves little more than taking advantage of their personal
contacts, relationships or interpersonal skills to persuade the prosecu-
tor to grant their clients some concessions.
Criminal defense lawyers who primarily rely on contacts, per-
sonal relationships or personal magnetism to persuade prosecutors to
give their clients favorable plea bargains sometimes are able to secure
good or even tremendous bargains. Too often, however, a lack of
preparation - and commitment - forces such lawyers to plead out
72 This pressure may be particularly intense in a rural or small county, see DONALD D.
LANDON, CouNTRY LAWYER: THm IMPAcT OF CONTACTS ON PROFESSIONAL PRACICE,
145 (1990), but it affects every defense lawyer who has a number of pending cases with a
prosecutor or who expects to be plea bargaining with that prosecutor in the future. De-
fense counsel cannot attempt to curry favor with a prosecutor by trading the interests of
one client in return for a favorable disposition for another client. ABA STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JusTIcE 4-6.2, commentary at 209 (3d ed. 1993). Such overt "trading" plainly
violates the lawyer's duty of undivided loyalty to a client and is so blatant it is unlikely to
be a serious systemic problem. But the desire to please a prosecutor with awesome discre-
tion and the corresponding pressure to be "cooperative" to avoid alienating that same
adversary unquestionably weighs on the mind of any defense lawyer who sits down to
bargain a series of cases or who is subtly reminded during a negotiating session of a second
case that needs to be discussed. Despite the client's right to zealous representation, it is
simply not possible to advocate every client's case with equal zeal during plea negotiations.
A defense lawyer cannot claim in every negotiation that the defendant deserves "a break"
because of "special circumstances." For a more detailed description of defense counsel's
unavoidably difficult position, see The Defense Attorney's Role, supra note 16, at 1210-24.
A full exploration of this important but complex issue is, however, beyond the scope of this
article.
73 My experience reflects the observations made by numerous commentators. See, e.g.,
DERSHOWrrz, supra note 19, at 400-02, 404-05; Bazelon, supra note 16, at 8-11; Blumberg,
supra note 17, at 20-31.
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their clients to bargains that are not in the clients' best interests. The
problem is most acute for the defendant who is innocent or who does
not wish to accept the state's plea offer. For these defendants, the
defense lawyer who is trying to live off of or get by on personal con-
tacts will not want to offend or alienate friends on the prosecutor's
staff. The defendant will be given the choice of "playing ball" or find-
ing a new lawyer.
This is not to say that defense counsel should ignore the impor-
tance of attempting to maintain cordial relations with the lawyers in
the prosecutor's office. 74 An arrogant or unnecessarily hostile atti-
tude is unlikely to redound to the client's benefit.75 Nevertheless, de-
fense counsel cannot allow her interest in maintaining a cordial
relationship with a prosecutor to compromise her representation of a
client.76
74 Charles Craver reports that he has seen an excellent negotiator with a sarcastic, deri-
sive style who treated everyone with contempt. According to Craver, he was a proficient
bargainer because his adversaries acquiesced to his demands to terminate having to deal
with him. CHARLES B. CRAVER, EFrncrIVE LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT 2 (2d
ed. 1993). Given the superior bargaining position the prosecutor normally possesses, it is
extremely unlikely that a criminal defense lawyer would have much success adopting this
negotiating style. In fact, my experience mirrors that of Gifford and Amsterdam: a
friendly, accommodating style usually works best. See Gifford, supra note 7, at 80-81; AM-
STERDAM, supra note 28, §§ 101, 212.
75 My experience in different jurisdictions confirms the observations of numerous ob-
servers that prosecutors will find ways to penalize defense lawyers they dislike. See, e.g.,
Gifford, supra note 7, at 78 (prosecutors will punish defense lawyers they view as too ad-
versarial by refusing to grant typical plea bargains); PLEA BARGAINING, supra note 5, at 51
("prosecutors will make the discovery procedures more cumbersome for certain defense
attorneys whom they disliked or distrusted"); Robert Rader, Confessions of Guilt: A
Clinic Student's Reflections on Representing Indigent Criminal Defendants, 1 CLiN. L. REv.
299, 308-17 (1994) (describing frustrations felt by clinician defense lawyers who had to deal
with Roxbury prosecutors who treated them poorly, in part because of their adversarial
attitude). Although a prosecutor clearly has the discretion to choose to plea bargain with
some defendants and not with others, Russell v. Collins, 998 F.2d 1287, 1294 (5th Cit.
1993), overt discrimination by a prosecutor against a lawyer or the clients of that lawyer is,
of course, impermissible. See Bourexis v. Carroll County, Md., Narcotics Task Force, 625
A.2d 391 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993). See also Complaint of Rook, 556 P.2d 1351 (Or.
1976) (prosecutor disciplined for refusing to offer similarly situated defendants plea bar-
gain offered to other defendants because he disliked their lawyer); Boulas v. Superior
Court, 188 Cal. App. 3d 422, 233 Cal. Rptr. 487 (2d Dist. 1986) (case dismissed because
prosecutor attempted to steer defendant wishing to plea bargain away from original lawyer
whom the prosecutor disliked to a different lawyer). But a prosecutor's broad discretion
gives her considerable - and virtually unchecked - room to make life miserable for the
defense lawyer whose attitude or conduct arouses the prosecutor's ire. See AmSTERDAM,
supra note 28, § 212.
76 This is particularly true, but difficult to do, if the prosecutor is arrogant and heavy-
handed. Although a cooperative, friendly approach with such a prosecutor, is not going to
change his personality or competitive bargaining style, counsel's positive, professional atti-
tude may minimize hostility and tension in the bargaining session and avoid sparking ex-
cessive competitive behavior on the part of the prosecutor. CRAVER, supra note 74, at 72-
77.
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Thus, the conscientious defense lawyer is often in a precarious
position. Defense counsel must attempt to provide zealous represen-
tation in a system geared to the efficient resolution of cases which, for
the most part, means entering into negotiated settlements. It is the
criminal defense lawyer who vigorously investigates the facts,
researches the law, raises appropriate and creative motions, demon-
strates a willingness to go to trial and competently handles the trial
who is providing the representation demanded by the ethical rules and
ABA Standards. Yet, counsel who seeks to gain an advantage for her
client in the plea bargaining process by engaging in legitimate tactics
- such as filing and aggressively litigating discovery motions, sup-
pression motions, requests for jury instructions, and the like - runs
the risk of alienating judges and prosecutors primarily concerned
about efficiently disposing of the mass of cases on their crowded dock-
ets.77 Similarly, a good defense lawyer may want to respond to a pros-
ecutor's inappropriate or unjustified threats in the plea bargaining
process by refusing to continue to negotiate and going to trial. She
may want to do so not only to secure justice for her individual client
but also to demonstrate her willingness to go to trial rather than ac-
cept a poor plea bargain.78 Defense counsel may find herself, how-
ever, forced to agree to a poor plea bargain despite her efforts,
recommendations and desires because ultimately the choice of ac-
cepting a proffered settlement is the client's. 79
It is important-to recognize, then, that it is the defendant's inter-
77 See HEumANN, supra note 18, at 61-75 (describing prosecutorial and judicial hostility
to defense lawyers who file pre-trial motions). As Justice Brennan noted, a criminal de-
fense lawyer not only has an obvious financial interest in resolving a case quickly, that
lawyer "may have a strong interest in having judges and prosecutors think well of him."
Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 761 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Nonetheless, Brennan
concludes, "good lawyers undoubtedly recognize these temptations and resist them." Id. at
761-62. For a disturbing story of a good public defender who resisted such temptations and
lost her job, at least in part because of her zealous advocacy, see Lincoln Caplan, Unequal
Loyalty, A.B.A. J. (July 1995) at 54.
78 Some practitioners suggest that defense lawyers turn down unacceptable plea bar-
gains and go to trial - even though the jury may be out only fifteen minutes - to con-
vince inflexible prosecutors that they have the will to fight. See, e.g., Bell, supra note 8, at
27. Such an approach is likely to reap some benefits for future clients. Nonetheless,
although defense counsel has a strong personal and professional interest in rejecting a poor
bargain to send a clear message to an inflexible prosecutor that she will not be pushed
around, counsel cannot unilaterally refuse a deal - or manipulate the client's decision
concerning the deal - in order to enhance her professional stature or improve her credi-
bility for future negotiations. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
79 See MODEL RuLE 1.2(a); Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983); ABA STAN-
DARDS FOR CRIMINAL JusicE 4-5.2(a) and commentary (3d ed. 1993). For a further look
at the extent to which the client's desires to settle and unwillingness to go to trial may
undercut counsel's ability to secure a good outcome, see The Defense Attorney's Role,
supra note 16, at 1306-13; CRAVER, supra note 74, at 267-69.
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ests, attitude and desires, together with various systemic pressures,
that frequently put criminal defense lawyers in a difficult and frustrat-
ing position. Defense lawyers all too often find themselves represent-
ing an unsympathetic defendant with a lengthy criminal record in a
case without any apparent defense. The zealous advocate with a case
in which the defendant has little or no leverage confronts a daunting
challenge. Many defense lawyers have endured the unpleasant task of
going to negotiate on behalf of an unemployed recidivist who simply
wants to plead guilty and "bargaining" with a particularly hard-
headed prosecutor who is perfectly aware that the state's case is virtu-
ally unassailable. In such a case, defense counsel may feel more like a
beggar than a bargainer, left with little more than the unenviable
chore of imploring a mean-spirited prosecutor to be fair or
reasonable.80
Defense counsel cannot allow her frustrations and a sense of fu-
tility to undermine her representation or undercut her preparation.8'
In fact, criminal defense lawyers have some or even good leverage in a
significant number of cases and will often be negotiating with prosecu-
tors willing to listen and prepared to grant some reasonable conces-
sions. Thus, while defense counsel must be sensitive to systemic
pressures and be conscious of the extent to which such pressures influ-
ence the decisionmaking of criminal defendants, defense counsel must
become as effective as possible in insulating defendants from the pres-
sure to enter into poor plea bargains, learn how to generate and maxi-
mize leverage, and develop the best range of alternatives possible for
their clients. Good lawyering demands that defense counsel devote
the time and energy necessary to achieve the best possible result. Ab-
8o Although the image of the advocate going hat in hand to beg for mercy for one's
client may be far-removed from the romanticized view of the criminal defense lawyer de-
picted in the movies, on television and in print, it is all too familiar to those who have
represented many criminal defendants. See, e.g., Randy Bellows, Notes of a Public De-
fender, in PHILIP B. HEYMANN & LANCE LIEBMAN, THE SocIL4u REsPONSIBILITIES OF
LAWYERS: CASE STUDIES 69 (1988); JAMES S. KUNEN, How CAN You DEFEND THOSE
PEOPLE?: THE MAKING OF A CRIMINAL LAWYER (1983). Many public defenders, espe-
cially those in programs with excessive caseloads, have had to struggle with a sense of
frustration and bum-out that, in part, is fueled by the task of negotiating too many cases,
with too little leverage, with opponents who arrogantly wield their power, on behalf of
clients who seldom seem to care. See generally McIrvRE, supra note 20, at 159-66; Ogle-
tree, supra note 21.
81 Like most public defenders, I gave my all for my clients despite the fact that many of
them felt I "wasn't a real lawyer." It was frustrating to see a poor family scrape up $1000
at the last hour to pay a private lawyer to plead the client guilty to a deal that I spent days
negotiating. Even more frustrating was a case in which I spent over 80 hours putting to-
gether a well-orchestrated sentencing hearing only to have the judge rubber-stamp the
prosecutor's sentencing recommendation. The temptation to shortcut one's preparation in
the face of such frustration can be difficult to resist.
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sent such preparation, counsel will not be providing the zealous repre-
sentation her clients deserve.
I. THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS: PLANNING THE DANCE
A. Learning the Music and the Steps
Good criminal defense lawyers do not start out assuming their
client is guilty or that a plea bargain is the best resolution of the case.
Rather, as the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice recognize, the
competent, committed advocate will "conduct a prompt investigation
of the case and explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to the
merits of the case and the penalty in the event of a conviction." 2
Even if the defendant expresses a clear desire to plead guilty, the law-
yer still has the responsibility to undertake an appropriate investiga-
tion to ensure that the client's intended guilty plea has a basis in fact
and in law.83 Admittedly, the extent of that investigation and the law-
yer's ability to push for a trial will be significantly hamstrung if the
defendant lacks the will or desire to contest the charge.s4 Nonethe-
less, the diligent defense lawyer understands that the defendant may
not recognize potential defenses or appreciate legal challenges so she
will carefully evaluate the merits of the case before even considering
jettisoning the trial option.
Similarly, in gathering information from the defendant about his
or her background and in investigating the case, defense counsel
should take care not to allow a client's professed preference for a
guilty plea to cause counsel to prejudge the case or to curtail the
search for valid defenses and important legal issues. Moreover, be-
82 ABA STANDARDS FOR CiumiNAL JusTIcE 4-4.1(a) (3d ed. 1993).
83 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JusTicE 4-4.1, commentary at 181-82 (3d ed. 1993)
(discussing defense counsel's duty to investigate and make a detached evaluation regard-
less of the client's admission of guilt or stated desire to plead guilty). See also Woodward
v. Collins, 898 F.2d 1027, 1029 (5th Cir. 1990) (strong presumption of competence of coun-
sel is not appropriate when lawyer advises client to plead to an offense which counsel has
not investigated).
84 Unquestionably, courts take into consideration the attitude and behavior of the de-
fendant in assessing ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on the adequacy of coun-
sel's investigation. For example, in Gray v. Lucas, 677 F.2d 1086 (5th Cir. 1982), cert
denied, 461 U.S. 901 (1983), the defendant refused to identify witnesses and insisted he
wanted no one to testify on his behalf at trial and offer mitigating evidence. The court
noted that the defendant's refusal to assist counsel did not negate the attorney's duty to
investigate, but concluded that "the scope of that duty was limited by Gray's [the defen-
dant's] refusal." Id at 1094. A number of courts, however, have found that defense coun-
sel's failure to investigate or present mitigating evidence based on defendant's instructions
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Blanco v. Singletary, 943 F.2d 1477
(11th Cir. 1991); Thomas v. Kemp, 796 F.2d 1322 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 996
(1986); Thompson v. Wainwright, 787 F.2d 1447 (11th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 481 U.S.
1042 (1987).
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cause such preparation is a necessary prelude to negotiation, defense
counsel should not prematurely press the defendant for permission to
negotiate8s Defense counsel who too eagerly pushes the merits of
plea bargaining or "working out a deal" may lose her client's confi-
dence.86 If the client is unfamiliar with the workings of the criminal
justice system, it may be appropriate for defense counsel to discuss the
settlement option. Prior to doing so, however, defense counsel should
discuss with the defendant his or her expectations and desires regard-
ing the case s7 and undertake an appropriate factual and legal
investigation.
Once counsel has completed that investigation and is satisfied
that the prosecutor possesses a sound factual basis for the crime
charged, counsel may seek the client's permission to negotiate.88 De-
85 See supra notes 82-83. In some cases, however, it may be critical to act quickly. The
first defendant to the prosecutor's office in a multi-defendant case may be able to secure a
terrific advantage. See AMSTERDAM, supra note 28, § 208. See also supra note 42.
86 Other commentators also have warned of the dangers of prematurely broaching the
subject of pleading guilty, especially with a client who has consistently insisted she is inno-
cent. See, e.g., AMsTERDAM, supra note 28, §§ 208-09. Moreover, raising the subject of
plea bargaining too quickly may exacerbate the tendency of many clients to mistrust ap-
pointed counsel. See Gifford, supra note 7, at 78.
87 A defense lawyer cannot simply assume what the client's priorities are; she must ask.
A client may be much more concerned about collateral or non-legal consequences than the
ultimate disposition of the criminal charge, but without an adequate inquiry, counsel may
not accurately determine the client's true priorities. See CRAVER, supra note 74, at 48-49;
BINDER, BERGMAN & PRICE, supra note 30, at 2-15.
88 In the first edition of the Standards Relating to the Defense Function, Standard
6.1(b) stated that: "[w]hen the lawyer concludes, on the basis of full investigation and
study, that under controlling law and the evidence a conviction is probable, he should so
advise the accused and seek his consent to engage in plea discussions with the prosecutor,
if such appears desirable." ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 6.1(b) (1971). Stan-
dard 6.1(c) of that same edition added that: "[o]rdinarily the lawyer should secure his cli-
ent's consent before engaging in plea discussions with the prosecutor." As the
commentary to the initial version of Standard 6.1 made clear, advance permission was to
be obtained before counsel initiated negotiations because the decision to plea bargain was
the client's. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. If counsel did have discussions with
the prosecutor, those discussions were to be kept preliminary and tentative in nature prior
to securing client consent and counsel was to make no binding commitments or disclosures
about the defense.
In the second edition of the Defense Function, 6.1(c) was dropped and subsection (b)
was modified to read: "[a] lawyer may engage in plea discussions with the prosecutor,
although ordinarily the client's consent to engage in such discussion should be obtained in
advance." ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JusTIcE 4-6.1(b) (2d ed. 1980). The commen-
tary to Standard 4-6.1(b) retained the same language from the commentary to the first
edition, declaring that "[u]ltimately, the definitive decision whether to engage in plea dis-
cussions is for the client, as is the decision of how to plead .... [C]ounsel may have an
opportunity to advance the client's interests without making any disclosures concerning the
defense. Ordinarily the client's consent should be sought and obtained before any ap-
proaches are made ...."
The ABA's latest version of 4-6.1(b) was further modified to read: "[d]efense counsel
may engage in plea discussions with the prosecutor. Under no circumstances should de-
[Vol. 2:73
HeinOnline  -- 2 Clinical L. Rev. 96 1995-1996
Plea Bargaining
fense counsel should make clear that engaging in settlement negotia-
tions does not necessarily mean that counsel is recommending that
alternative. Counsel should discuss with the client the extent of coun-
sel's settlement authority as well as the client's goals or desired out-
comes. If the client is not interested in pursuing a plea bargain and
insists on going to trial, defense counsel ought not initiate any settle-
ment discussions. This does not mean, however, that defense counsel
ought not try to persuade the defendant to reconsider such a choice,
especially if counsel's investigation suggests there is little chance to
prevail at trial. Indeed, it would be very poor lawyering to simply
permit a client to proceed to trial on a hopeless case without trying to
convince that client to consider plea bargaining.8 9 Moreover, defense
counsel is still obligated to relay to the defendant any offer made by
the prosecutor.9° If defense counsel, however, is unable to persuade a
fense counsel recommend to a defendant acceptance of a plea unless appropriate investiga-
tion and study of the case has been completed, including an analysis of controlling law and
the evidence likely to be introduced." ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JusmrcE 4-6.1(b)
(3d ed. 1993). Although the change was noted in the history of the standard, no explana-
tion was given for the change except to observe that "[tihe client's consent ordinarily need
not be sought and obtained before any approaches are made, as there will be occasions
when some discussion, perhaps only of a very tentative and preliminary nature, will occur
before an opportunity arises to obtain the defendant's consent. However, defense counsel
should keep the client apprised of all significant developments arising out of plea discus-
sions." ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JusTIcE 4-6.1(b), commentary at 205 (3d ed.
1993).
Although this modification grants defense counsel more flexibility and is consistent
with Standard 4-5.2, which gives defense counsel exclusive control over case tactics, the
change is inconsistent with a client-centered approach to decisionmaking. See generally
BINDER, BERGMAN & PRiCE, supra note 30. See also Robert D. Dinerstein, Client Cen-
tered Counseling: Reappraisal and Refinement, 32 ARiz. L. REv. 501 (1990); Stephen
Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV. 715 (1987); John K. Morris, Power and
Responsibility Among Lawyers and Clients: Comment on Ellmann's Lawyers and Clients,
34 UCLA L. REv. 781 (1987). Given the importance of the decision to plea bargain, the
fact that defense counsel may be disclosing critical information, the fact that many prosecu-
tors interpret a willingness to bargain as a concession of guilt, and the ABA's own ex-
pressed policy of not engaging in any negotiating until the lawyer's factual as well as legal
preparation has been completed, see supra note 83, it makes little sense to eliminate the
requirement that ordinarily the client's consent be obtained prior to any negotiation. If
counsel is approached before she has permission to bargain, she can still listen to a prose-
cutor's overtures about a possible bargain while politely indicating she is not authorized to
engage in any negotiations. If an unusually good opportunity presents itself, the version of
4-6.1(b) found in the first and second editions still allowed defense counsel to take advan-
tage of the opportunity to advance the client's interests. But those earlier versions wisely
suggested that the "ordinary" practice should be to secure the client's consent before any
plea bargaining. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JuSTicE 6.1 and commentary
(1971); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JuSTICE 4-6.1 and commentary (2d ed. 1980).
See also MODEL RULE 1.4, comment.
89 See White, supra note 26, at 371-74; AMSTERDAM, supra note 28, § 201. See also
infra notes 230-39 and accompanying text.
90 See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 929 F.2d 747, 751 (1st Cir. 1991). See also
MODEL RuLE 1.2(a) & comment; ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JusTicE 4-6.2(b) (3d
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defendant to allow her to negotiate, counsel generally should not con-
tinue to seek a plea agreement with the prosecutor even though coun-
sel feels that a plea bargain is in the defendant's best interest.91
If defense counsel and the defendant agree that plea bargaining
should commence, counsel must prepare so that she can negotiate ef-
fectively. As every article or text on plea bargaining recognizes, good
preparation is the key to successful negotiating.92 Although this point
may seem obvious, it is clear that a significant number of defense law-
yers initiate negotiations when they have done little more than inter-
view the client and briefly review the police reports.93
Effective preparation for a plea bargaining session - like effec-
tive preparation for trial - begins with a thorough client interview.
Rarely will defense counsel be able to effectively represent a client
without learning as much as possible about the client and his or her
knowledge of the facts surrounding the charges.94 It is also critical
ed. 1993). For a thorough discussion of the scope of this obligation, see Keith Bystrom,
Communicating Plea Offers to the Client in ETHICAL PROBLEMS FACING THE CRIMINAL
DEFENSE LAWYER - PRACTICAL ANSwERs TO TOUGH QUESTIONS 84 (Rodney J. Uphoff
ed., 1995).
91 Although a full discussion of the roles and relative decisionmaking prerogatives of
attorney and client is beyond the scope of this article, it is clear that the decision whether
to plead guilty must be left to the client. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. If the
defendant is making a choice - not to plea bargain - that defense counsel feels is con-
trary to the client's best interests, defense counsel should attempt to persuade the client to
change her position, but ultimately must respect that choice or, if appropriate, attempt to
withdraw from the case. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975) (Brennan, J., con-
curring) (observing that defendant, not his lawyer or the State, will bear the personal con-
sequences of a conviction and thus, even though defendant may conduct his own defense
ultimately to his own detriment, that choice should be respected). Like Professor Anthony
Amsterdam, I do not believe it generally is appropriate for counsel to threaten to withdraw
to coerce the defendant into a plea bargain even though counsel feels the bargain is in the
client's best interests. AMSTERDAM, supra note 28, § 201. If the defendant's competency is
in question, the lawyer's position becomes extremely delicate and difficult. See MODEL
RULE 1.14. For a look at defense counsel's demanding role when representing an impaired
defendant, see Rodney J. Uphoff, The Role of the Criminal Defense Lawyer in Represent-
ing the Mentally Impaired Defendant: Zealous Advocate or Officer of the Court?, 1988 Wis.
L. REV. 65, 65-109.
92 See, e.g., AMSTERDAM, supra note 28, §§ 208-11; CRAVER, supra note 74, at 47;
Glanzer & Taskier, supra note 62, at 8; ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING To
YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENTS WrrHouT GnNG IN 176 (1981).
93 See, e.g., Robert L. Doyel, The National College-Mercer Criminal Defense Survey:
Preliminary Observations About Interviewing, Counseling and Plea Negotiations, 37 MER-
CER L. REv. 1019, 1025-27 (1986); Klein, supra note 21, at 667-75. Inadequate preparation
leaves defense counsel without the ability to marshall much leverage or use that leverage
to secure a desirable plea bargain.
94 See, e.g., MONROE FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETmIcs 87-141 (1990);
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-3.1 & commentary (3d ed. 1993). Although
lawyers and commentators may disagree as to the best methods of securing facts from
those accused of criminal offenses, there is little disagreement that defense counsel must
secure the facts, including damaging ones, if counsel is going to be able to mount an effec-
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that defense counsel learn as much as possible about the client's per-
sonal circumstances and background. This information not only is
needed to determine if an affirmative defense such as a battered
woman's defense or insanity defense should be raised, but also it will
enable counsel to personalize the accused if the defendant subse-
quently takes the stand at trial.95 At a minimum, counsel needs to
know about a defendant's living situation, dependents, employment
history, education, past and present legal difficulties, 96 disabilities and
mental health history. In some cases, however, especially murder
cases with the possibility of the death penalty, counsel's inquiry into
the defendant's past will need to be even more extensive.97
Some clients may be reluctant to open up to personal questions
or may view questions about their background as unnecessary prying.
Counsel cannot, however, simply give up. Indeed, counsel's failure to
adequately pursue information about the defendant's background, in
some instances, can constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.98
Counsel usually can avoid or overcome a client's negative reactions to
such inquiries by explaining the importance of such questions and, if
appropriate, delaying sensitive questions until counsel has managed to
establish rapport with the client and win the client's trust at least to
some extent.
tive defense. For a critical look at the intentional or selective ignorance approach to client
interviewing, see FREEDMAN, supra at 109-41. See also ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JusTIcE 4-3.2 & commentary (3d ed. 1993). For a succinct, helpful guide to securing the
client's story, see AMSTERDAM, supra note 28, § 63.
95 It is generally acknowledged that defense counsel should humanize or personalize
the defendant when presenting the accused as a witness. See Waters v. Thomas, 46 F.3d
1506, 1519 (11th Cir. 1995). In Waters, Judge Clark agreed with the strategic importance of
humanizing the defendant, but severely criticized defense counsel's decision to put the
defendant on the stand and implement that strategy, given the facts of the case. Indeed,
Judge Clark concluded that Waters' lawyer "either intentionally sabotaged his client's case,
or he had no idea what his client would say on the stand" because Waters' testimony "did
anything but 'humanize' him in the eyes of the jury." Id. at 1544-45 (Clark, J., dissenting
and concurring). For an excellent discussion of the importance of humanizing the defen-
dant in a capital case, see White, supra note 26, at 360-67.
96 The defendant's criminal record clearly is one of the most important of the factors
influencing the disposition of the defendant's case. See PLEA BARGAINING, supra note 5,
at 76. It is not always easy for defense counsel to find out the true state of a client's prior
record. The client may be confused about the disposition of prior charges or fail to appre-
ciate whether an earlier offense was actually a criminal offense, a misdemeanor or felony,
or ultimately expunged. Some clients will attempt to hide or lie about their record. Before
making any representation about a client's record or lack of one, defense counsel usually
would be well-advised to ask the prosecutor to supply counsel a copy of the client's record.
97 Simply put, in death penalty litigation, counsel's ability to find mitigating circum-
stances in the defendant's past may be the difference between life and death for a client.
See White, supra note 26, at 337-55.
98 See, e.g., Brewer v. Aiken, 935 F.2d 850, 857 (7th Cir. 1991); People v. Perez, 148
Ill.2d 168, 592 N.E.2d 984, 170 Ill. Dec. 304 (1992). See also supra notes 83-84 and accom-
panying text.
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To negotiate effectively, defense counsel must be so familiar with
the defendant and her life experiences that counsel can personalize or
humanize the defendant when talking with the prosecutor. 99 Defense
counsel who is unaware or unprepared when the prosecutor inquires
about the defendant's present job status or work history may seriously
undermine the effort to obtain a favorable sentencing concession. Fi-
nally, defense counsel who is informed about and ready to present
effectively the defendant's mitigating personal circumstances also will
be able to afford the defendant zealous representation at sentencing.
In addition, it is critical that defense counsel inquire about the
defendant's personal situation so counsel can advise the client about
the collateral consequences of a guilty plea or conviction.100 A crimi-
nal conviction can cost a defendant the right to drive, a professional
license or even the ability to remain in this country. Although a de-
fense attorney's failure to alert or warn a defendant about such collat-
eral consequences generally has not been deemed sufficient to
invalidate a plea or to secure reversal of a conviction on grounds of
ineffective assistance of counsel, 1 1 the lawyer's role as counselor re-
quires that she apprise the client of considerations that are likely to
affect the client's life. Indeed, these so-called collateral consequences
may be considerably more important to the defendant than the pun-
99 A recent case handled by a law student intern at the University of Oklahoma's Crim-
inal Defense Clinic highlights the importance of personalizing the defendant. The client,
an undergraduate student, was charged with felony shoplifting. Although the defendant
had no prior record, the prosecutor would only agree to recommend probation, but would
not reduce the charge to a misdemeanor. After several fruitless negotiating sessions, the
student re-interviewed the client and gathered more information about her background.
He learned that the client had held two jobs during high school and still graduated at the
top of her class; that she had maintained her scholarship and honor roll status at the Uni-
versity while continuing to hold a job; that she was the first of a large, very poor family to
attend a university; that she was active in her church and participated in a number of
community service projects. Armed with this additional knowledge, the student was able
to present a more sympathetic picture of the defendant and, ultimately, able to convince
the prosecutor to reduce the charge.
100 See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 14-3.1 & commentary at 75 (2d ed.
1980) (urging defense lawyers to fully advise defendants of collateral consequences when
the defendant raises any question about such consequences or the nature of the case sug-
gests such consequences may result from the defendant's plea); AMSTERDAM, supra note
28, §§ 204-05 (stressing that no intelligent plea decision can be made without considering
all possible consequences; also setting forth a useful checklist of possible consequences).
101 See, e.g., Varela v. Kaiser, 976 F.2d 1357 (10th Cir. 1992) (defense counsel not re-
quired to warn alien client that he likely would be deported if he pleaded guilty); United
States v. Yearwood, 863 F.2d 6, 8 (4th Cir. 1988) (guilty plea not invalid because of coun-
sel's failure to alert defendant to deportation consequence); United States v. Romero-
Vilca, 850 F.2d 177, 179 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that defendant's potential deportation is a
collateral consequence). But see Hill v. Lockhart, 894 F.2d 1009, 1010 (8th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 497 U.S. 1011 (1990) (counsel's erroneous parole advice constitutes ineffective assist-
ance because defendant's decision to plead guilty was based on this advice).
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ishment meted out by the judge at sentencing in the criminal case.102
Accordingly, defense counsel should make the defendant aware of the
full impact of a criminal conviction and help the defendant evaluate
possible collateral consequences before making significant decisions
about the case.
Next, counsel must attempt to assess the strength of the prosecu-
tion's case as well as counsel's ability to attack that case or success-
fully present an affirmative defense. In some cases, this is a fairly easy
proposition. The defendant, for example, is caught in front of numer-
ous witnesses walking out of a store with an item she was attempting
to steal and gives a statement admitting the offense. In many other
cases, however, defense counsel faces a formidable challenge in as-
sessing the true strength of the prosecution's evidence. This task is
complicated by the fact that counsel may have limited access to the
prosecution's case, especially in the early stages of a criminal prosecu-
tion.103 If defense counsel, either by statute or because of the prac-
tices of the local prosecutor, has easy and early access to police
reports and other discovery material, counsel's task is much easier.104
102 For example, possible civil litigation or a forfeiture action growing out of the events
which led to the defendant's criminal charge may be of much more concern to the defen-
dant. It is critical not only that defense counsel evaluate the interplay between the defen-
dant's pending criminal case and a possible civil action, but also recognize the double
jeopardy implications of multiple proceedings against the defendant. Counsel may be able
to manipulate this interplay between the criminal and civil actions to secure dismissal of
the criminal case. See, e.g., Dep't of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937
(1994) (drug tax stamp was penal in nature, not a mere civil penalty); Austin v. United
States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993) (civil drug forfeiture action is punishment for double jeop-
ardy purposes); United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989) (civil sanction can be punish-
ment for double jeopardy purposes); United States v. 405,089.23 in U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d
1210 (9th Cir. 1994) (civil forfeiture action is punishment barring subsequent criminal
action).
103 See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 2002 (1994) (defense not entitled to any discovery
prior to a preliminary hearing). But see FLA. STAT. ANN § 3.220 (1995) (providing for
broad discovery, including the taking of discovery depositions, within 15 days of the defen-
dant's notice of election to participate in discovery). Discovery practices vary widely from
state to state, within a state and often even within a particular jurisdiction. See LAFAVE &
ISRAEL, supra note 60, at 725-41. For a discussion of the merits of early defense access to
discovery material because, among other reasons, it facilitates informed plea bargaining,
see ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 11-1.1 & commentary (2d ed. 1980).
104 In some jurisdictions, defense counsel may be able to speak directly with the arrest-
ing or investigating officers and gain considerable information about the prosecution's
case, the impact of their testimony as well as their attitude about the defendant. See AM-
sTERDAM, supra note 28, §§ 91-95 (urging counsel to seek information directly from po-
lice). The willingness of police officers to talk with defense counsel varies significantly
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and even within a particular police department. Moreover,
counsel must listen with a skeptical ear to information provided by the police because
officers at times will embellish, distort or even lie to convince counsel that the defendant
should "cooperate" in some fashion. For a detailed look at the extent to which police
officers will stretch the truth and bend constitutional requirements to help secure convic-
Fall 19951
HeinOnline  -- 2 Clinical L. Rev. 101 1995-1996
CLINICAL LAW REVIEW
To meaningfully assess the prosecution's case, defense counsel
usually will need to secure the assistance of an investigator' 05 and
often expert witnesses as well. 1' 6 Accordingly, it is incumbent upon
defense counsel to file a motion requesting the appointment of an ex-
pert or investigator at the state's expense and arguing that such assist-
ance is necessary to assure the defendant's right to due process and
the effective assistance of counsel. 1°7 National studies consistently
show, however, that criminal defense attorneys frequently fail to ob-
tain or are denied ready access to adequate investigative assistance
and expert services despite the importance of such support services. 108
As part of the investigation leading up to settlement negotiations,
defense counsel also should attempt to ascertain if the prosecutor has
any significant proof problems. Counsel should try to determine if the
state's witnesses are still around and actually available to testify. This
is easier to discover in a state like Oklahoma where the prosecution's
witnesses must be identified on the initial charging document.' 0 9 Sim-
ilarly, talking to prospective defense witnesses, particularly alibi wit-
nesses, is an important part of the preparation process. Counsel must
not only be able to assess the strength of the defense witnesses' testi-
mony but be able to realistically predict whether those witnesses will
tions, see Myron Orfield, Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An Exclusionary Rule
in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. REv. 75 (1992).
105 Even if counsel has the time to investigate a case on her own (which is often not the
case), it is particularly problematic for counsel to attempt to interview witnesses - espe-
dally those witnesses who are or potentially could become adverse - without the assist-
ance of a third person. "Unless defense counsel is prepared to forgo impeachment of a
witness by counsel's own testimony as to what the witness stated in an interview or to seek
leave to withdraw from the case in order to present such impeaching testimony, defense
counsel should avoid interviewing a prospective witness except in the presence of a third
person." ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUsrc 4-4.3(e) (3d ed. 1993). Defense coun-
sel who acts as her own investigator, therefore, runs a serious risk of compromising the
effective impeachment of witnesses and the successful defense of her client's case. See
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUsTICE 4-4.3, commentary at 187-88 (3d ed. 1993);
MODEL RULE 3.7; MODEL CODE DR 5-102(A).
106 For a discussion of the importance of experts in preparing an arson case and the
difficulties of preparing for trial without such assistance, see Larry A. Hammonds & Jon M.
Sands, Trial By Fire: Preparing to Defend an Arson Case, THE CHAMPION, April 1995, at 4.
107 Counsel will have to rely on Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985) (indigent capital
defendant entitled to funds to hire psychiatrist to assist the defense) and cases which have
extended Ake (see, e.g., Little v. Armontrout, 835 F.2d 1240, 1243 (8th Cir. 1987) (revers-
ing conviction for failure to supply state-funded expert on hypnosis); Ex Parte Dubose, No.
1930827, 1995 WL 124653 (Ala., Mar. 24, 1995) (defendant entitled to funds to retain DNA
expert); Rey v. State, 897 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (failure to provide defendant
with forensic pathologist violated due process)).
108 See, e.g., LEFSTEIN, supra note 26; ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 5-1.4 &
commentary (3d ed. 1992); NATIONAL STUDY COMMISSION ON DEFENSE SERVICE, GUIDE-
LINES FOR LEGAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES (1976).
109 See OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 384 (1991).
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actually show up and testify at trial.110 In addition, counsel must judge
the strength of the defendant's own testimony and the merits of the
defendant's taking the witness stand.
Another aspect of counsel's preparation is to determine the status
and positions of any co-defendants, co-conspirators or other persons
involved in the events underlying the charge facing the defendant.
The existence of other individuals who also are implicated in the
crime often complicates counsel's task. These people may play a key
role in exonerating or burying defense counsel's client. Again, it may
be difficult to figure out in advance of a negotiating session whether
these other persons are planning to plead guilty or to testify against
counsel's client."' Nonetheless, the more information that defense
counsel has about the role that others played in an offense and the
defendant's relationship with these other persons, the better able
counsel will be to assess the risks the defendant faces.
In addition to determining if the state has sufficient, available evi-
dence to convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt of the defen-
dant's guilt, defense counsel should ascertain whether the legality of
any aspect of the state's case can be challenged. This evaluation also
should be made, as best as possible, before attempting to resolve the
case. Certainly defense counsel should be able to conduct the neces-
sary legal research to determine if the charging instrument, 1 2 the
manner in which the charge was brought 13 or the underlying stat-
ute" 4 is subject to any constitutional or other legal challenge.
110 As every experienced criminal defense lawyer knows, many of the defendant's family
members, friends, and acquaintances are willing to help the defendant. Too often, how-
ever, that help, for a variety of different reasons, does not include actually testifying at
trial.
111 If a co-defendant is unrepresented, counsel should attempt to obtain information
directly from the co-defendant. In most instances, however, the co-defendant will be rep-
resented and should not be contacted without the permission of the co-defendant's lawyer.
MODEL Rux.E 4.2; MODEL CODE DR 7-104(A)(1); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profes-
sional Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-396 (1995).
112 The indictment, information or complaint may be fatally defective because, among
other reasons, it fails to allege each of the essential elements of the charged offense, see,
e.g., Fitzsimmons v. State, 426 A.2d 4 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981), or it fails to describe the
alleged crime with sufficient particularity, thereby providing inadequate notice to the de-
fendant, see, e.g., Miller v. State, 827 P.2d 875 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992).
113 For example, in some jurisdictions the indictment may be subject to challenge based
on the insufficiency or unreliability of the evidence underlying the indictment, see, e.g.,
Adams v. State, 598 P.2d 503 (Alaska 1979), or because the state's excessive delay compro-
mised the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, see, e.g., Doggett v.
United States, 502 U.S. 976 (1991).1 , 114 See, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (California statute making it ille-
gal to loiter "without apparent reason or business" and to refuse to supply identification to
a police officer was unconstitutionally vague); People v. Smith, 862 P.2d 939 (Colo. 1993)
(Colorado statute prohibiting offensively coarse language was facially overbroad).
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Although occasionally a prosecutor may welcome such a challenge,
most prosecutors do not want to expend limited resources and to be
embroiled in a time-consuming constitutional battle." 5 Defense
counsel who can identify and mount an effective challenge to the con-
stitutionality of a statute will find herself with a strong bargaining
chip. The prosecutor may well decide to abort the case at the trial
level rather than risk the statute being struck down.
Defense counsel confronts a more difficult task in assessing the
viability of most evidentiary motions. With limited access to the
state's case, the defense lawyer often must speculate what explana-
tions law enforcement officers will proffer to justify their seizure of
the accused or of some incriminating evidence. Counsel then must
predict how those justifications will play before the trial judge and
possibly an appellate court. Unquestionably, defense counsel's ability
to raise and to litigate suppression motions effectively is an important
factor in defense counsel's overall effectiveness." 6 Aggressive motion
practice may enable counsel to secure the dismissal of charges in a
case in which the defendant has no defense on the merits. It is essen-
tial, therefore, that before starting any serious negotiations, counsel
determine whether any motions are appropriate, assess the strength of
those motions and prepare fully to argue those motions if counsel and
the client deem it strategically wise to do So. 1 1 7
Before initiating plea bargaining, a few final preparatory steps
are necessary. Defense counsel should scour the statutes to try to find
lesser offenses which directly or indirectly deal with the defendant's
conduct. There may be another felony offense, a misdemeanor or
even a municipal ordinance violation that defense counsel can argue is
a better fit or a suitable compromise in the defendant's case. In some
115 As busy trial lawyers, most prosecutors do not have the time or inclination to brief
weighty constitutional issues. They may be particularly reluctant to take on a well-
designed attack on a questionable statute that has been a useful weapon in the prosecu-
tion's arsenal.
116 For an extensive discussion of the importance and of the strategic uses of pretrial
motions, see AMSTERDAM, supra note 28, §§ 221-253A. The effective use of appropriate
motions often will induce a prosecutor to offer a favorable plea bargain. See White, supra
note 26, at 370.
117 It may not always be desirable to file suppression motions because that action may
be perceived as hostile by the prosecutor. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. In
some instances, however, it may be necessary early in the case to file such motions to
preserve the defendant's right to litigate them even though counsel has not yet formulated
a negotiating strategy. Before making any final decisions regarding motions, defense coun-
sel must consult with and involve the defendant. See MODEL RULE 1.2 & comment. For a
discussion of the issue of whether the client or the attorney is the ultimate decisionmaker
in the context of suppression motions, see George Bisharat, Pursuing the Questionable
Suppression Motion, in ETHICAL PROBLEMS FACING THE CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYER,
supra note 90, at 63.
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instances, defense counsel may even be able to find an administrative
regulation that covers the defendant's behavior. Counsel also should
determine if there are any local conventions - e.g., a dismissal upon
payment of terms - which represent a suitable resolution of the de-
fendant's charges. 118
Just as it is important for defense counsel to be aware of any local
conventions which may provide a simple and satisfactory resolution of
the defendant's case, it is critical to learn the "standard deal" in a case
such as the defendant's. Although a prosecutor's initial offer will de-
pend on a number of variables, prosecutors generally work from a
starting point or "standard deal" that is based primarily on the nature
of the charge and the defendant's record.1 9 The extent to which a
prosecutor ultimately will be willing to deviate from that "standard
deal" generally depends on a host of factors including: time and re-
sources; defense counsel's ability, reputation and relationship with the
prosecutor; evidentiary concerns; the victim's wishes; and the aggra-
vating and the mitigating circumstances of the case. 20 Nevertheless,
the criminal defense lawyer who is aware of the "standard deal" prior
to going into a negotiating session will be better able to plan for that
118 During the 1980's in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, for example, it was fairly common for
counsel to be able to secure the dismissal of a traffic case by agreeing to pay a relatively
modest monetary penalty. This "dismissal upon terms" was not provided for by statute,
but was an accepted local practice which enabled an overcrowded system to dispose of a
large number of minor cases. On the other hand, the current local convention in East
Moline, Illinois, whereby defendants in drug cases are allowed to pay significant fines in
exchange for a recommendation of no prison time raises serious questions of the fairness
and the propriety of permitting wealthy defendants to buy their way out of trouble. Inter-
view with Rita Fry, Public Defender for Cook County (Apr. 28, 1995).
119 These "standard deals" may be contained in written guidelines formulated by those
in charge of the prosecutor's office or based on unwritten practices developed over time
and passed on to newer members of the office. Indeed, many "prosecutors have developed
criteria that guide the exercise of their discretion. These standards and rules of thumb are
not to be found in codes, case reports, and other sources of law, but a working understand-
ing of them is part of the accumulated skill and experience of the effective defense lawyer."
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRI&NAL JUsTIcE 4-6.1, commentary at 204 (3d ed. 1993). For an
example of a prosecutor's office which has developed a set of written guidelines for the
handling of misdemeanor cases, see MILWAUKEE COUNTY DisTRicr ATrORmY'S OFFICE,
GUIDELINES FOR THE DISPOSITON OF MISDEMEANOR CASES (1994).
120 For an examination of the factors that prompt prosecutors to offer concessions in
their cases, see ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMNAL JUSTIcE 3-3.9, commentary at 73-75 (3d
ed. 1993). Professor Amsterdam observes that the factors influencing a prosecutor to exer-
cise discretion in favor of an accused are "innumerable," but he identifies some deserving
particular mention: (1) the prosecutor's personal belief in the accused's innocence, (2) the
strength of the state's case, (3) the likely availability of evidence at trial, (4) the habits,
attitudes and sympathies of local judges and juries, (5) docket congestion and the prosecu-
tor's own workload, (6) the extent to which the police, complainant, and media are likely
.to be satisfied by the outcome of the plea bargain, (7) the defendant's prior record and
potential dangerousness, (8) potential exposure of police misconduct or error, and (9) the
accused's cooperation. AMSTERDAM, supra note 28, § 100.
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session as well as to respond to developments in the negotiating
process.121
Defense counsel also must weigh the possibility that the defen-
dant could be prosecuted in another forum for the events which form
the basis for the defendant's pending charge. It may well be in the
defendant's interest for counsel to persuade the prosecutor that the
case would be more appropriately handled in that other forum. 122 In
some instances, counsel may have to engage in plea negotiations in
different forums on the same matter or in several jurisdictions involv-
ing multiple cases in an effort to minimize the defendant's punishment
or exposure. 23 In other cases, counsel may have to make discrete
inquiries about general policies or practices of prosecutors in another
county or of federal authorities in an effort to secure information -
without arousing attention - about the likelihood of charges being
filed against the defendant.124
Finally, many defendants are caught up in the criminal justice sys-
tem because they have alcohol, drug or mental health problems. Such
problems may have led directly to the defendant's pending charge or
they may be significantly affecting the defendant's life and her ability
to cope with any demands or restrictions placed upon her. Prosecu-
tors and judges recognize the significance of substance abuse and
mental health problems and, to varying degrees, attempt to respond to
such problems in plea bargaining and sentencing.' 25 Such problems
121 As the commentary to ABA Standard 4-6.1 recommends, defense counsel who is
handling a case in a jurisdiction in which she is unfamiliar with the usual plea bargaining
and sentencing practices should check with an experienced local practitioner or the local
public defender's office, if any, to ascertain if there is a standard deal or disposition in the
type of case she is handling. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JusTIcE 4-6.1, commentary
at 204-05 (3d ed. 1993). For a discussion of the risks of ignoring this advice, see infra notes
156-59 and accompanying text.
122 For example, cases involving university students can be handled by university admin-
istrators who may mete out an academic punishment less serious and more appropriate for
counsel's client. On the other hand, defense counsel may wish to avoid an available ad-
ministrative process and the imposition of administrative sanctions because for some cli-
ents, the consequences may be more serious than the punishment accorded by the criminal
justice system.
123 See, e.g., Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 87 (1985) (successive murder prosecutions
by two States for the same murder not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause).
124 Defense counsel should be aware of the Department of Justice's "Petite policy," for-
mally acknowledged in Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960), whereby federal prose-
cutors will not commence a federal prosecution following a state prosection for the same
substantive offense without prior authorization from the Justice Department and compel-
ling reasons. A plea agreement made with a state prosecutor is not binding on a federal
prosecutor. See Meagher v. Clark, 943 F.2d 1277, 1281 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Sandate, 630 F.2d 326, 328 (5th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 450 U.S. 922 (1981).
125 It is common in state courts for judges to weigh a defendant's personal characteris-
tics in determining an appropriate sentence. See generally ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE 18-6.3 (3d ed. 1994).
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may, at times, be mitigating and lead to very favorable outcomes for
some defendants. In other cases, however, a defendant's mental con-
dition or drug problem may lead to a much harsher disposition. If
defense counsel is aware of a client's condition or problem as a result
of counsel's confidential communications with the defendant, defense
counsel should not disclose the existence of that condition or problem
without the defendant's consent.126
If a competent client acknowledges a problem and accepts coun-
sel's advice that it is strategically wise to disclose the problem, counsel
still may need to substantiate or document the problem in order to
secure an advantage during the negotiation process. In addition, it
may be extremely helpful to develop a program or plan for addressing
the client's problem. Indeed, defense counsel's ability to find a suita-
ble program not only may be necessary to convince the prosecutor
and judge to agree to a disposition of the defendant's case that allows
her to remain in the community, but it also may be critical to helping
the defendant stay out of the criminal justice system in the future. 27
B. Selecting the Right Music and Choreographing the Steps
Once defense counsel has taken the steps necessary to prepare to
plea bargain, she must formulate an appropriate negotiating strategy
to use for that particular case. Some commentators have argued that
126 See MODEL RULE 1.6. In some cases, the defendant's behavior at the time of the
arrest, her statements to the police or the defendant's subsequent conduct make non-dis-
closure a moot issue because the prosecutor is well aware of the defendant's condition or
problem. In such a case, defense counsel should discuss with the defendant her desires and
attitudes regarding counseling or treatment for the problem. Defense counsel's role is par-
ticularly sensitive, however, in any case in which the prosecution is unaware of the defen-
dant's problem or counsel is unsure of the nature or extent of the client's possible problem
or condition. In such instances, defense counsel clearly must obtain the defendant's per-
mission before attempting to utilize the client's condition or problem during negotiations.
In some cases, communication problems or the defendant's mental state may cause counsel
to question her client's competency. Defense counsel may need to consult with an expert,
review the client's medical records and treatment history or advise the client to speak to an
expert before taking any action to resolve the case. For a detailed discussion of defense
counsel's role in representing a mentally impaired defendant, see Uphoff, supra note 91.
For a discussion of the important assistance a mental health expert can render in ensuring
that defense counsel provides quality representation, see James J. Clark, Lane J. Veltkamp
& Edward C. Monahan, The Fiend Unmasked: Developing the Mental Health Dimensions
of the Defense, CRnl. JusTicE (Summer 1993) at 23.
127 See Doyel, supra note 93, at 1028-29 (noting in survey of criminal defense lawyers
that they rated knowledge of sentencing alternatives and treatment programs as critical
factors in defense counsel's success in plea negotiations). Defense counsel should recog-
nize, however, that many clients have longstanding problems that they are either unwilling
or unable to handle. Thus, the strategy of presenting a sentencing proposal involving pro-
bation with participation in a treatment program may ultimately backfire by resulting in a
revocation of probation and a longer sentence than the defendant originally would have
received.
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a particular negotiating style or set of principles is applicable in any
negotiation context. 128 Other theorists contend that a lawyer's negoti-
ating approach should vary depending on the lawyer's assessment of
the particular negotiation in question, the context and the players
involved.129
Professor Don Gifford has fashioned a negotiating strategy which
he argues can be used by criminal defense lawyers as a model in most
plea bargaining situations. 3 0 According to Gifford:
negotiation theory suggests that the plea bargaining strategy most
likely to succeed in a typical case is one which begins with a compet-
itive approach and progresses to a cooperative approach as negotia-
tions continue. To accomplish this strategy switch, the defense
attorney should attempt to maintain a cordial and accommodative
relationship with the prosecutor, even during the early phases of
bargaining. 131
Gifford concludes that the use of this strategy for most criminal cases
is possible - despite the fact that the mechanics of plea bargaining
and the behavior patterns of the attorneys vary depending on the lo-
cale and the case - because the plea bargaining process "generally
exhibits certain characteristics that determine which strategy is likely
to succeed."'1 32
Although Gifford's model provides a helpful starting point in
choosing a negotiating strategy, it does not eliminate the need for de-
fense counsel to examine and to analyze carefully a number of sys-
temic factors, including the characteristics identified by Gifford, 33 to
128 See, e.g., FISHER & URY, supra note 92 (criticizing competitive negotiating and call-
ing for principled negotiations based on a problem-solving or integrative approach); GER-
AL) WILLIAMS, LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETrLEMENT (1983) (proposing a cooperative
negotiating strategy).
129 See, e.g., Gary Lowenthal, A General Theory of Negotiation Process, Strategy and
Behavior, 31 U. KAN. L. REv. 69 (1982).
130 See Gifford, supra note 7, at 73-82. Gifford's article also provides an excellent sum-
mary of different theories of negotiation and outlines three distinct negotiating strategies:
competitive, cooperative and integrative. Id. at 41-58.
131 Gifford, supra note 7, at 82. Gifford describes the competitive negotiator as one who
"tries to maximize the benefits for his client by convincing his opponent to settle for less
than she otherwise would have at the outset of the negotiation process." Id. at 48. The
competitive strategy utilizes tactics including a high initial demand; limited disclosures of
facts and one's own preferences; few and small concessions; threats and arguments; and
apparent commitment to one's position during the negotiating process. Id. In contrast, the
cooperative negotiator seeks to develop trust by initiating concessions designed to create
reciprocal concessions and ultimately a fair agreement. Id. at 52-54.
132 Id. at 73.
133 According to Gifford, before selecting a negotiation strategy, defense counsel should
consider the following systemic characteristics or factors: the prosecutor, the relative bar-
gaining power in the specific case, the desire to maintain good working relations with the
prosecutor and judge, the systemic pressure to dispose of the case quickly, the need to
maintain a good rapport with a client, and the local bargaining norms. Gifford, supra note
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see how these factors play out in counsel's specific case. It is the inter-
play of these factors which invariably will affect counsel's ability to
achieve a desirable plea bargain. Gifford admits that "when deciding
a negotiating strategy, the defense attorney should always determine
the factors that distinguish the instant case from the usual plea bar-
gaining situation. If these factors are important, the attorney may
want to modify the suggested strategy."' 134 Even adopting Gifford's
model, then, defense counsel in every case must examine a host of
important systemic factors. Although these factors will change some-
what from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and even from case to case
within a jurisdiction, counsel's analysis of these variables is essential if
counsel is to obtain the best plea bargain possible for the client. Just
as a failure to prepare adequately may be fatal to counsel's success in
plea bargaining, the use of any generalized approach without analyz-
ing the specific variables relating to the defendant's particular case
undoubtedly will limit counsel's effectiveness.
The first factor counsel must consider, albeit not necessarily the
most important, is the strength or weakness of the defendant's case. 135
Unquestionably, the stronger the prosecution's case, the less leverage
counsel will have in the bargaining process. On the other hand, if the
defendant has a strong defense, defense counsel may wield considera-
ble leverage in the process. Yet, as has already been suggested, it is
often difficult for defense counsel to assess the strength of the prose-
cution's case with any precision.136 Even if defense counsel has early
access to the state's evidence, experienced trial lawyers recognize that
a case that is strong on paper may not be nearly as strong when the
witnesses actually testify at trial. In fact, as noted earlier, the state's
witnesses may not show up at trial or they may testify wholly inconsis-
tently with what is contained in the police reports.1 37 Although de-
7, at 74-78.
134 Gifford, supra note 7, at 82.
135 Research suggests that both the decision to plead guilty and the terms of the final
plea bargain are influenced heavily by the strength of the state's case. PLEA BARGAINING,
supra note 5, at 65-66.
136 See supra notes 103-09 and accompanying text. In describing the uncertainty of the
defense's appraisal of the prosecution's case in connection with an assessment of the advis-
ability of a guilty plea, Justice White observed that: "considerations like these frequently
present imponderable questions for which there are no certain answers; judgments may be
made that in the light of later events seems improvident, although they were perfectly
sensible at the time." Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 756-57 (1970).
137 "Police reports are universally decried by prosecutors as inadequate and unrelia-
ble.... Prosecutors know that the police often omit or distort information in their police
reports. Therefore, without interviewing the police and the witnesses themselves, prosecu-
tors are never very sure about how strong their cases really are." PLEA BARGAINING,
supra note 5, at 22. My experience with police reports in a number of jurisdictions is
similar. The accuracy of the reports varies considerably. Accordingly, defense counsel
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fense counsel generally will be in a better position to assess the
strengths and weaknesses of the defense case, counsel's ability accu-
rately to assess the likelihood of an acquittal ultimately turns on her
experience, the case and the quality of her judgment.
In addition, defense counsel must determine if there are any ag-
gravating or mitigating circumstances related to the defendant's crime
which distinguish it from similar offenses. For example, a battery case
between two men in which the victim sustained a black eye is likely to
be viewed differently than if the same case resulted in a fractured jaw.
Similarly, the prosecutor may view the seriousness of a defendant's
battery offense as markedly worse if the victim was elderly or the
beating was accompanied by racial slurs. 138 Because the aggravating
or mitigating circumstances of an offense often will influence how
others in the system view the defendant's case, defense counsel must
weigh the impact of any such circumstances in the defendant's case
before selecting a negotiation strategy.139
A second significant variable that defense counsel must take into
consideration when formulating a plea bargaining approach is the
prosecutor handling the defendant's case.' 4° The personality, philoso-
phy, trial ability and negotiating style of the prosecutor should influ-
ence defense counsel's approach in a variety of ways. For example, a
particular prosecutor may be generally reluctant to go to trial and ea-
ger to dispose of cases by way of negotiation. If defense counsel is
aware that the prosecutor assigned to the case has such an attitude,
counsel may have more leverage than when facing a prosecutor who
loves to try cases. Similarly, some prosecutors are superb trial lawyers
while others are weak. Thus, in evaluating the likelihood of success at
trial and correspondingly, the viability of the trial option should nego-
should not accept police reports at face value nor assume that such reports necessarily
contain accurate information. For a detailed examination of the problem of police miscon-
duct in drafting police reports, see Stanley Z. Fisher, Just the Facts, Ma'am: Lying and the
Omission of Exculpatory Evidence in Police Reports, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1 (1993).
138 In fact, many states have enacted legislation authorizing more serious penalties for
crimes involving certain classes of victims, see, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 991a-9 (1991)
(elderly or incapacitated victim) and for offenses which were racially motivated, see, e.g.,
Wis. STAT. § 939.645 (1993) (enhanced penalties if defendant intentionally selected victim
based on race, religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry).
139 Indeed, defense counsel's ability to effectively package the mitigating circumstances
of the case together with the defendant's mitigating personal characteristics is often critical
to counsel's success in the negotiating process. See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying
text. See also PLEA BARGAINING, supra note 5, at 77-78.
140 Numerous studies confirm that plea bargains vary significantly depending on the
identity of the prosecutor handling the case. See, e.g., Julie Homey, Plea Bargaining Deci-
sion Factors, in IMPROVING MANAGEMENT IN CRIMINAL JusTcE 73 (A.W. Cohen & B.
Ward eds., 1980); WILLIAM RHODES, PLEA BARGAINING: WHO GAIs? WHO LosEs?,
(1978); Gifford, supra note 7, at 74-76.
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tiations break down, counsel must take into account the prosecutor's
trial skills.
Defense counsel may have dealt with a prosecutor enough to be
able to determine if that prosecutor has a particular or unusual negoti-
ating style. Certainly some prosecutors appear to engage in the bar-
gaining process when, in fact, they never intend to move off of their
initial offer. This negotiating approach - making a reasonable open-
ing offer and refusing to budge - has been labeled Boulwarism in the
labor context.' 4 ' Defense counsel negotiating with a prosecutor who
adopts such a highly competitive strategy may be making a mistake if
she responds to the prosecutor in a cooperative manner and discloses
weaknesses in the state's case or positive aspects of the defense case in
an effort to convince such a prosecutor to grant concessions. 142 In-
deed, disclosing information to such a prosecutor may strengthen his
or her hand by weakening the defendant's chances for success at trial.
On the other hand, if the prosecutor is a fair and reasonable negotia-
tor, counsel may be inclined to share more information and do so
early in the bargaining process. Whenever possible, therefore, de-
fense counsel should attempt to learn as much as she can about the
prosecutor's bargaining style.143
As discussed earlier, heavy caseloads pressure many prosecutors
to plea bargain most of their cases.'" Thus, caseload pressure may
provide defense counsel important leverage. This pressure tends to be
141 See HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 48 (1982). This
tactic is named after Lemuel Boulware, who, as a vice-president of General Electric, uti-
lized such an approach in negotiating with the company's unions. In the labor context, the
tactic has been deemed to be an unfair labor practice if the employer combines a "take-it-
or-leave-it" bargaining offer with a widely publicized stance of unbending firmness, leaving
the employer unable to alter its original position. See NLRB v. General Elec. Co., 418
F.2d 736, 762 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 965 (1970); Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v.
The Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 659 F. Supp 771, 775 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
142 See Gifford, supra note 7, at 60-62,79-82. It is highly unlikely that a hard-bargaining
prosecutor will suddenly start being reasonable in response to defense counsel's coopera-
tive approach. Indeed, "it is almost impossible for cooperative/problem-solving persons to
induce competitive/adversarial people to behave in a cooperative way." CRAVER, supra
note 74, at 21.
143 See Gifford, supra note 7, at 75-76. Unlike Gifford I have not found prosecutors
generally to be cooperative bargainers. Rather, it has been my experience that many pros-
ecutors are hard, positional bargainers who are often able "to obtain a favorable result
simply by being stubborn." FISHER & URY, supra note 92, at 12. No matter what style the
prosecutor has, defense counsel would be wise to attempt to look at the defendant's case
from the prosecutor's perspective in order to better anticipate the prosecutor's likely ap-
proach, arguments and bottom line. Id. at 23 (stressing the value of a negotiator putting
herself in her adversary's shoes).
144 See supra note 59 and accompanying text. See also Richard B. Gerstein, Plea Bar-
gaining from the Prosecutor's Standpoin4 in PRAMcIcio LAW INsTrruTE, FOURTH AN-
NUAL CRImINAL ADVOCACY INSTITTE, W,,mIo Tm CRmIA. CASE BEFORE TRIAL 53,
57 (1971).
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somewhat uneven, however, so defense counsel may be in a better
bargaining position at certain times than at others. 145
Defense counsel's bargaining strategy also should take into con-
sideration the charging process used by the prosecutor's office. If pos-
sible,146 defense counsel should attempt to get involved in the process
before formal charges are filed because counsel may be able to exert a
positive influence on the charges finally selected or even block the
issuance of charges. Frequently, however, counsel will not be retained
or appointed until after formal charges are filed. Counsel nonetheless
should bear in mind that the nature of the charging process is likely to
influence the prosecutor's willingness to dismiss or to reduce charges
as part of a plea bargain. 47
Many prosecutors' offices have written office policies regarding
certain crimes and particular types of sentencing-related conces-
sions.14 These policies may severely restrict a particular prosecutor's
ability to dismiss cases or reduce charges to lesser offenses. The more
informed defense counsel is about such policies, the better able coun-
sel will be to obtain a favorable disposition for the client. Moreover,
the prosecutor's freedom to bargain frequently depends on the prose-
cutor's status or rank in the office. Young prosecutors tend to feel the
need to appear "tough" and so are often reluctant or even unwilling to
dismiss charges. This is particularly so if the charges have been filed
by an experienced, senior prosecutor. The culture or politics of a
prosecutor's office also may limit the individual prosecutor's freedom
to bargain.
Finally, most prosecutors' offices, especially the larger ones, have
an internal chain of command which defense counsel needs to con-
145 See CRAVER, supra note 74, at 16 (noting that the negotiator's ability to take advan-
tage of time and caseload pressures will lead to more favorable settlements).
146 Not only must it be possible, but it also must be desirable strategically to get involved
in the charging process. In some cases and in some jurisdictions, it may be more advanta-
geous to wait to negotiate until formal charges actually have been issued.
147 The process or structure for arriving at an initial charging decision varies significantly
among jurisdictions. Rigorous screening by an experienced prosecutor who uses a high
threshold level of proof and discusses the case with police officers and civilian witnesses
before issuing the charges leads to much different plea bargaining than that which occurs in
a jurisdiction in which charges are filed based on a paper review. The prosecutor working
in an office which utilizes a more elaborate screening review is less likely to consider dis-
missing a charge than the prosecutor who knows that the charges were based only on a
cursory review of police reports. For a more detailed look at the manner in which different
charging procedures affect the plea bargaining process, see PLEA BARGAININo, supra note
5, at 9-48.
148 Office policy may dictate that the prosecutor always recommend a prison sentence in
an armed robbery case or in any burglary case in which the defendant has a prior burglary
conviction. The extent to which a prosecutor's office has formalized procedures and poli-
cies varies markedly and turns largely on the office's size, past practices, and the ideology
of the chief prosecutor. See PLEA BARGAINING, supra note 5, at 44-46.
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sider in formulating her negotiating strategy.149 If there is a viable
review process within the prosecutor's office, counsel may be able to
negotiate somewhat differently than if no such review is possible. Say,
for example, that a young, fairly hard-headed prosecutor is handling a
minor felony case. If defense counsel knows that she ultimately can
go over that prosecutor's head to a senior prosecutor if she is not satis-
fied with the prosecutor's final offer, then counsel's negotiating tactics
may be different than in a situation where no such review is possi-
ble.' 50 If the senior prosecutor or final decisionmaker in a prosecu-
tor's office is unreasonable or unapproachable, defense counsel will
have to cope with the fact that the initial prosecutor is the one who
must be convinced if a favorable bargain is to be obtained.
Defense counsel's ability to obtain a favorable outcome also is
influenced by another variable: the judge assigned to the defendant's
case. In some jurisdictions this variable is particularly hard to assess
because no particular judge is assigned in advance of a trial or a guilty
plea hearing. This increases defense counsel's uncertainty and limits
her ability to predict the merits of going to trial, arguing sentencing or
accepting a settlement offer. The importance of this variable, there-
fore, depends in large part on the scheduling practices and procedures
of the jurisdiction. Nonetheless, defense counsel must recognize that
the client's critical decisions as well as counsel's leverage in the bar-
gaining process may turn substantially on the personality, philosophy
and sentencing proclivities of the judge to whom the case finally is
assigned. 151
Defense counsel generally is in a better position when going into
a negotiating session if she is knowledgeable about the judge who will
eventually hear the case. The judge may be a tyrant or exceptionally
fair at trial.' 52 The judge may be reasonable or extremely harsh in
imposing sentences. Some judges blindly follow the sentencing rec-
ommendations of prosecutors while others are open to defense coun-
149 Id.
150 Counsel must be mindful that going over a prosecutor's head may damage counsel's
relationship with that prosecutor and adversely affect future negotiations. If possible, de-
fense counsel should seek to obtain review by a senior prosecutor in a manner that does
not directly challenge or threaten the prosecutor handling the case. Nonetheless, counsel's
responsibility to provide zealous representation may require counsel to pursue a review
despite the potential damage. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text. Counsel
must remember, however, that seeking internal review too often may reap diminishing
returns.
,.151 See PLEA BARGAINING, supra note 5, at 78.
152 For an interesting discussion of the legitimacy of "shopping" for a judge whose biases
are likely to work to the defendant's advantage, see Eva S. Nilsen, The Criminal Defense
Lawyer's Reliance on Bias and Prejudice, 8 GEO. J. LEG. ETmIcs 1, 33-34 (1994).
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sel's arguments. 53 Some judges clearly punish defendants who go to
trial and lose. Other judges are very responsive to political pressure,
especially near election time.1'5 Thus, a judge may be more willing to
accept a plea bargain or respond favorably to a defense lawyer's sen-
tencing argument in certain cases - those out of the public eye -
than in others.155
Admittedly, defense counsel may be hard-pressed to get an accu-
rate assessment of how a particular judge will respond to a certain
client or specific offense. Nevertheless, a lawyer is courting disaster if
she fails to take into account the extent to which the sentencing
proclivities of the judge may control the outcome of a case. 56 Take,
for example, the case of an appointed defense lawyer in Wisconsin
who was representing a defendant charged with a residential burglary.
Although the defendant had just turned eighteen and had no adult
record, he did have a lengthy juvenile record that included several
burglary adjudications. Defense counsel approached the prosecutor
with a proposed plea bargain: his client, a first offender, would plead
guilty to the charge in exchange for a recommendation of probation.
The experienced prosecutor quickly agreed, recognizing that in front
of Judge Fine, the judge who was assigned to the case, the prosecutor's
recommendation of probation was really meaningless in light of the
judge's usual practice of sending a person to prison for a second bur-
153 See CASPER, supra note 21, at 136-44 (decrying willingness of judges to defer to
prosecutorial recommendations); PLEA BARGAINING, supra note 5, at 68, 93-107 (influence
of judge's sentencing reputation and willingness to follow prosecutors' recommendations
varies significantly).
154 Indeed, as Justice Stevens warned, some trial judges in capital cases are "too respon-
sive ... to a political climate in which judges who covet higher office - or who merely
wish to [be reelected every six years and thus remain judges) - must constantly profess
their fealty to the death penalty. The danger that they will bend to political pressures when
pronouncing sentence in highly publicized capital cases is the same danger confronted by
judges beholden to King George HI." Harris v. Alabama, 115 S. Ct. 1031 (1995) (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
155 Trial judges may find it extremely difficult to give a lenient sentence, even if war-
ranted, if the glare of public attention is too bright. See, e.g., State v. Comstock, 485
N.W.2d 354 (Wis. 1992) (reversing trial judge who vacated guilty pleas to two reduced
misdemeanor counts and reinstated four felony counts when victim (daughter of a county
official) and her supporters appeared at the sentencing protesting the agreement). De-
fense counsel's ability to find a means to take the public heat off of the judge may well be
the difference between prison and probation for a client. For example, in one case I han-
dled, getting a friendly clerk to hastily re-schedule a sentencing for a Friday afternoon
without the press being alerted definitely produced a more receptive climate and enabled
me to persuade a reluctant judge to grant probation to one of my clients who was facing a
lengthy prison sentence.
156 See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRiNmuAL JuSTIcE 4-6.1, commentary at 204 (3d ed.
1993) (ignorance of the criteria that guide the court's discretion as well as the court's atti-
tude and practices regarding plea bargains is as much a handicap to effective representa-
tion as is unfamiliarity with the law or the facts of a case).
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glary offense. Given this defendant's extensive juvenile record, Judge
Fine clearly would not view him as a first offender. Defense counsel
and his client, both unaware of Judge Fine's sentencing philosophy
and practices, entered the guilty plea with the expectation that the
judge would follow the prosecutor's recommendation. To their shock,
Judge Fine gave the defendant eight years in prison.157
This case illustrates the importance of securing information about
the sentencing judge. Because the defense lawyer in this case knew
nothing of Judge Fine or his sentencing practices, defense counsel re-
ally did not get any benefit from the deal he struck with the prosecu-
tor. 158 Had he been aware of Judge Fine's attitude toward residential
burglars and his sentencing policies, counsel may have been able to
strike a bargain for a shorter prison recommendation which, in turn,
Judge Fine may have followed. Or, at least, defense counsel may have
been better prepared to go into the sentencing hearing with more am-
munition and arguments designed to persuade Judge Fine to deviate
from his standard practice in such cases. Finally, had the defendant
been advised that Judge Fine was likely to send him to prison if he
entered a plea, the defendant may have evaluated his trial prospects
differently and decided to go to trial. In the end, however, lack of
preparation and analysis robbed the client of effective
representation. 159
157 For the judge's own view of this case, see RALPH ADAM FINE, EsCAPE OF THE
GuwTry (1986). Under Wisconsin law, the defendant in this case had no basis for appeal
because it is well-settled that a judge is not bound by any recommendation nor obligated to
advise the defendant before imposing sentence that he or she is not inclined to follow the
prosecutor's recommendation. Young v. State, 182 N.W.2d 262 (Wis. 1971). In other juris-
dictions, a defendant who enters a guilty plea pursuant to a plea bargain will be permitted
to withdraw that plea and go to trial if the judge is unwilling to accept the negotiated
agreement. See, e.g., FED. R. Cgim. P. 11(e)(4); United States v. Ellison, 798 F.2d 1102,
1105 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1038 (1987); State v. King, 553 P.2d 529 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1976).
158 Indeed, good criminal defense lawyers are able to realistically assess the value of any
proffered plea bargain because they know the prosecutors' standard offers and the general
sentencing practices of the judges in their jurisdiction. See The Defense Auorney's Role,
supra note 16, at 1229-30, 1268-70.
159 The failure to accurately predict a judge's willingness to follow a sentencing recom-
mendation generally will not render a plea involuntary or constitute ineffective assistance
of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). See Chichakly v. United
States, 926 F.2d 624, 630 (7th Cir. 1991) (plea not involuntary even though counsel's pre-
diction that plea would result in light sentence did not come true); United States v. Garcia,
909 F.2d 1346, 1348-49 (9th Cir. 1990) (trial judge did not abuse discretion in refusing to
withdraw plea even though counsel erroneously predicted sentence); Baker v. United
States, 781 F.2d 85, 91 (6th Cir. 1986) (a plea is not involuntary or counsel's representation
defective simply because counsel's good faith predictions turn out to be "mistaken either
as to facts or as to what a court's judgment might be on given facts"). Nevertheless, if
defense counsel materially misinforms the defendant about a plea or her advice is very far
from the norm, the defendant may be able to successfully challenge the plea. See, e.g.,
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As with most prosecutors, most judges have heavy dockets which
pressure them to move cases. To relieve pressure on their dockets,
judges push all of the actors in the system to settle their cases. 160 Judi-
cial settlement pressure may work to the client's advantage or disad-
vantage depending upon the case and the other systemic variables
discussed in this article. Defense counsel's ability to recognize, to un-
derstand and to manipulate that pressure to the client's advantage
may spell the difference between a good or marginal outcome for the
client.
Another significant variable in the bargaining process is defense
counsel's own reputation, preparation and relationship with the other
actors in the system.' 61 Some defense lawyers in certain cases will be
able to obtain a very favorable outcome for a client simply because of
who they are. It may be that defense counsel formerly worked in the
prosecutor's office or has a particularly good relationship with the
prosecutor handling the case.162 Defense counsel's reputation as a
brilliant lawyer often will give that lawyer considerable leverage in the
plea bargaining process. Similarly, defense counsel's poor reputation
- especially as a lawyer who never goes to trial - will severely di-
minish that lawyer's bargaining power. 163 The extent to which defense
counsel can successfully implement a competitive negotiating strategy
will, in part, be a function of counsel's trial abilities and her capability
of projecting a credible threat to take a case to trial.' 64
Lawyers who are just starting out in a jurisdiction usually will
have comparatively little bargaining power until they gain a reputa-
tion as a willing and able trial lawyer. It may be difficult for such a
lawyer, therefore, to adopt a highly competitive negotiating stance in
an effort to wring concessions out of an experienced prosecutor be-
cause that prosecutor will not view defense counsel's threat to go to
trial as credible. A criminal defense lawyer can enhance her credibil-
ity and begin to build a good reputation by demonstrating through
United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 40 (3d Cir. 1992); Hill v. Lockhart, 894 F.2d 1009, 1010
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1011 (1990); Laycock v. New Mexico, 880 F.2d 1184, 1186
(10th Cir. 1989); Iaea v. Suun, 800 F.2d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 1986).
160 See PLEA BARGAINING, supra note 5, at 130, 136; Courtroom Misconduct, supra note
48, at 679-85. For a detailed examination of the ways judges formally and informally en-
courage settlement, see PAUL RYAN, ALLAN ASHMAN, BRUCE D. SALE, & SANDRA SHANE
Du-Bow, AMERICAN TRIAL JUDGEs: Tmm WORK STYLES AND PERFORMANCE (1980).
161 See PLEA BARGAINING, supra note 5, at 68.
162 See, e.g., DERSHOWITZ, supra note 19, at 400-02; PLEA BARGAINING, supra note 5, at
68.
163 The Defense Attorney's Role, supra note 16, at 1187; CRAVER, supra note 74, at 65.
Even more damning than a reputation as an inept trial lawyer is a reputation for being
dishonest or deceitful. Such a reputation will be difficult to overcome. See, e.g., PLEA
BARGAINING, supra note 5, at 52; CRAVER, supra note 74, at 313-14.
164 See CRAVER, supra note 74, at 65.
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good motion practice and through effective presentations in court and
in negotiating sessions that counsel knows the law as well as the facts
of her case.165 The criminal defense lawyer who fails to investigate
her case or to research the law and who evinces a willingness to plead
guilty quickly to dispose of her cases is doomed to a reputation as a
mediocre advocate. 166
There are other variables which have a significant effect in some
but not all criminal cases. Arresting officers clearly exercise consider-
able discretion in determining what charges, if any, actually are
brought against a criminal defendant. 67 Moreover, police officers
regularly communicate with prosecutors about defendants and their
cases. Not surprisingly, then, the attitude and input of the arresting or
investigating officers will at times greatly influence a prosecutor's atti-
tude about a case. 168 In some jurisdictions, defense counsel may be
able to influence the feelings of the arresting or investigating officer
with respect to the defendant and to get that officer to make a positive
comment on the defendant's behalf or, at least, refrain from denigrat-
ing the defendant. 69 In other cases or in other jurisdictions, prosecu-
tors may be generally unresponsive to feedback from the police
regarding case dispositions. 70
Some prosecutors are very sensitive to crime victims so that the
attitude and input of the complaining witness may be critical in deter-
mining the parameters of a plea bargain.' 71 This may be especially
true in certain types of offenses such as sexual assault or domestic
violence. 172 Certainly, actors in the criminal justice system have paid
more attention to victims of crime in recent years. 73 Nonetheless, the
165 See Glanzer & Taskier, supra note 62, at 8.
166 See DERSHOWrrZ, supra note 19, at 415; The Defense Attorney's Role, supra note 16,
at 1186-87; Gifford, supra note 7, at 79-80.
167 LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 60, at 3-12, 563.
168 See PLEA BARGAINING, supra note 5, at 69 (reporting that the impact of the police
on plea bargaining varied markedly by jurisdiction). See also ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIM-
n4AL JusTICE 4-3.1 (3d ed. 1993) (recommending that the prosecutor seek input from law
enforcement officials before reaching a plea agreement).
169 See PLEA BARGAINING, supra note 5, at 69 (in four of six jurisdictions surveyed,
researchers found that most prosecutors felt police opinion mattered and made a "substan-
tial difference" in their plea bargains).
170 Id at 69 (25% of the prosecutors surveyed said they rarely or never sought police
input).
171 See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMNA. JUSTICE 14-3.1, commentary at 72-73 (2d ed.
1980) (advising prosecutors to seek input from victims before reaching a plea agreement).
172 Prosecutorial responsiveness to victims' concerns varies significantly from jurisdic-
tion to jurisdiction. See PLEA BARGAuI-NG, supra note 5, at 68-69. In fight of the decision
in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991), permitting victim impact testimony in death
penalty cases, prosecutors are more likely than ever to solicit input from family members
in capital cases.
173 The increased role that victims play in the criminal justice system is reflected by the
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influence the complaining witness will have in the disposition of a case
will vary significantly depending on the crime, prosecutorial policies
and the underlying merits of the case.174 In some instances, the desire
of the complaining witness to dismiss or drop the charges may provide
defense counsel considerable leverage.175 On the other hand, the
complaining witness may pressure a reluctant prosecutor to push a
marginal case to trial rather than work out a reasonable settlement.
Defense counsel, then, cannot afford to ignore this variable before se-
lecting a negotiation strategy.
Linked to the attitude of the complaining witness is the attitude
of the community toward crime in general and to defense counsel's
client in particular. Defense counsel's efforts to secure a favorable
disposition for a client may be thwarted because of the publicity and
attendant public sentiment generated by a particular crime.176 Simi-
larly, a crackdown on drunk driving, car jackings or drug dealing may
produce intense publicity which complicates the ability of the prosecu-
tor and defense counsel to arrive at an acceptable plea agreement. In
fact, defense counsel's ability to achieve a favorable outcome for a
client may depend on counsel's success in minimizing media atten-
tion. 77 At the very least, counsel must be sensitive to this variable
before settling on an approach to use with the prosecutor.
Once defense counsel has prepared thoroughly and has analyzed
the factors likely to affect the defendant's case, counsel is ready to
plea bargain. To bargain effectively, defense counsel must develop a
victims' rights legislation enacted in many states and the corresponding media attention
provided to victims and victims' rights groups. See, e.g., Jerry Adler, Bloodied But Un-
bowed, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 3, 1995, at 54-56. For a further look at victims' rights issues, see
GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: PROTECTING VICTIMS IN CRIMINAL
TRIALS (1995).
174 See PLEA BARGAINING, supra note 5, at 69 (concluding that victims' wishes rarely
are considered outside of notorious cases and, in some jurisdictions, rape cases). Even in
those states providing a victim the right to have the sentencing judge informed of the im-
pact of the crime on the victim, the victim need not be advised of the details of a plea
agreement. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 950.04(2m) (1995).
175 See, e.g., AMSTERDAM, supra note 28, § 104. See also White, supra note 26, at 368-69
(arguing that defense lawyers in capital cases may be able to facilitate a favorable plea
bargain by talking with the victim's family members).
176 In a case that received national attention, Susan Smith was convicted and given life
for murdering her two young sons. Yet, prior to trial, her lawyers, David Bruck and Judy
Clarke, were unable to persuade the prosecutors to recommend a life sentence in exchange
for Smith's guilty plea largely because the case generated so much publicity and emotion
that plea bargaining was really not politically feasible.
177 Although the attorney may have a personal interest in maximizing publicity about a
case, such publicity may not serve the client's best interest. Before waging any defense in
the media, counsel must ensure that such a strategy is, in fact, likely to work to the client's
advantage, not just the lawyer's. For an article contending that proper use of the media
does serve the client's best interests, see Robert L. Shapiro, Using the Media to Your Ad-
vantage, THm CHAMPION, Jan./Feb. 1993, at 7.
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negotiation strategy that is tailored to the specific case she is handling
and that appropriately takes into account the systemic factors likely to
affect the disposition of the case, including the culture of the local
criminal justice system as well as counsel's own negotiating style. In
short, defense counsel must formulate a strategy that maximizes her
ability to take advantage of whatever leverage she can muster to
achieve the best possible outcome for her client.
III. IMPLEMENTING THE STRATEGY: MINIMIZING DANCING IN
THE DARK
The question of how counsel should proceed to implement the
negotiation strategy she has selected inevitably is linked to counsel's
reasons for choosing the strategy as well as counsel's own negotiating
style. Defense counsel must, of course, remain flexible and able to
respond to the ebbs and flows of the negotiation session. This article
does not offer a choreographed script, road map or game plan to use
in the typical plea bargain session. The better counsel is at anticipat-
ing moves and developments in the negotiating session, the better she
will be at devising initial plans and developing contingencies that will
allow her to respond effectively as negotiations unfold. Given the
number of variables involved and the fact that circumstances often
change drastically during negotiations, counsel must be able to ana-
lyze a changing situation, respond to rapid developments and make
tough judgment calls.
The complexity and fluidity of the plea bargaining process lends
me to disagree with Donald Gifford regarding the relative roles of
counsel and client in selecting a negotiating strategy. Gifford takes
the view that defense counsel not only must discuss negotiation strat-
egy with the client but that the choice of strategy is a joint decision.178
Gifford's position is different from that espoused by ABA Standard 4-
5.2 which provides that, after consultation, strategic and tactical deci-
sions are the exclusive province of defense counsel and from Anthony
Amsterdam's position that defense counsel controls all tactical deci-
sions including "what discussions will be had with the prosecutor.' ' 179
178 Gifford, supra note 7, at 59.
179 AMSTERDAM, supra note 28, § 85-A. See also ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL Jus-
i-IE 4-3.1, commentary at 148-49 (3d ed. 1993) ("the existence of such discussions between
counsel and client about the appropriate ends and means of representation do not signify,
of course, that counsel must simply defer to whatever decisions the client makes about how
the representation should proceed. A lawyer is not required to pursue objectives or em-
ploy means simply because a client may wish or demand that the lawyer do so."). Most
courts recognize that tactical decisions are defense counsel's responsibility. See, e.g., Jones
v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-54 (1983). In Jones, however, Justice Brennan argued for
giving more control over tactical decisionmaking to the defendant. In his view, "the func-
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Even though it may be generally desirable for counsel to discuss the
choice of negotiating strategy with the client and secure the client's
consent to a particular approach, it is often not feasible.' 8 0 Although
a lawyer generally should be required to seek the client's permission
before negotiating,' 8' she should not be obligated to fully discuss ne-
gotiation strategy in every case. The choice of negotiation strategy
may change dramatically depending on a variety of factors, including
which prosecutor is available on a given day. The need to react to a
wide range of contingencies and to maneuver in a free-flowing bar-
gaining session may preclude meaningful discussion and selection. As
a practical matter, the client's lack of a telephone or transportation
problems may seriously hamper or block communication between
lawyer and client, thereby delaying counsel's plea bargaining. In the
end, although a client's input into the lawyer's selection and imple-
mentation of strategy may be desirable, it is not, and probably ought
not, be mandated.182
On the other hand, counsel cannot select a strategy which ignores
the best interests of the client as defined by the client herself. For
example, the defendant may stand to gain by supplying information or
tion of counsel under the Sixth Amendment is to protect the dignity and autonomy of a
person on trial by assisting him in making choices that are his to make, not to make choices
for him, although counsel may be better able to decide which tactics will be most effective
for the defendant." Id. at 759 (Brennan, J., dissenting). As Brennan acknowledges, the
need to make quick decisions at trial justifies giving the attorney decisive authority over
certain strategic choices. Id. at 760. In contrast, decisions as to what issues to press on
appeal or what negotiating strategy to employ may allow for enough deliberation and re-
flection that such important tactical decisions should be the client's.
180 See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRmiNAL Jusric- 4-3.9, commentary at 178 (3d ed.
1993) (noting that while counsel should seek to explain strategy and keep the client in-
formed, "a lawyer ordinarily cannot be expected to describe trial or negotiation strategy in
detail"). See also MODEL RULE 1.4, comment.
181 See supra note 88.
182 Model Rule 1.4 requires that counsel explain a matter "to the extent reasonably
necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation."
As a proponent of client-centered decisionmaking, I believe counsel should make every
effort to involve the client in important decisions such as the selection of negotiation strat-
egy. I seriously question, however, that Gifford truly believes that the choice of negotia-
tion strategy is a joint decision. If so, then it is surprising that his list of factors to be
considered in choosing between a competitive and noncompetitive strategy should include
the "likelihood of future interaction with the opposing party." Gifford, supra note 7, at 65.
If the choice of strategy turns, in part, on the need to maintain a continued relationship
with the lawyer on the other side - and Gifford suggests such a need calls for a noncom-
petitive approach - the fully informed client is likely to be decidedly unenthusiastic about
basing a choice of strategy on the lawyer's interest in maintaining good relations with an-
other lawyer. My strong hunch is that the defendant would want the lawyer to use
whatever strategy maximizes the defense's advantage in the present case regardless of the
impact of such a strategy on the lawyer's future clients or her relationship with opposing
counsel. An extended discussion of this critical issue is, however, beyond the scope of this
article.
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agreeing to testify against other people. "Rolling over," "flipping" or
"ratting out" someone else can be extremely advantageous to the de-
fendant.183 It also can be dangerous and indeed, even deadly. Some
defense lawyers take the position that they will not provide represen-
tation to any client who wishes to turn on another person to save him-
self or herself. 84 Others argue, however, that defense attorneys,
especially those representing an indigent defendant, have an ethical
obligation to assist the defendant who wishes to be "a rat" or "a
snitch.' 8 5
Providing information to the state clearly is an alternative which
may be in the best interest of some clients. Because a client has the
right to set the objectives of the representation 186 and providing infor-
mation may be critical to that client's securing her objective - say,
for example, a dismissal of the charges - the client ought to have the
power to decide whether or not to cooperate with the state. A private
lawyer who does not wish to represent "a rat" is permitted to do so
but only if that lawyer has secured the client's informed consent at the
outset of the representation. 8 7
183 The terms used to describe the process whereby a person provides information to the
police or prosecutor in exchange for some benefit vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and
change over time. The use of an informant is a commonly accepted tool in the state's
battle against crime, a tool that unquestionably works to the benefit of some defendants
and potential defendants. See AMSTERDAM, supra note 28, § 105 (urging defense lawyers
to carefully evaluate and to fully advise their clients about any cooperation agreement
before entering into any such agreement). See also supra note 42.
184 See Monroe Freedman, The Lawyer Who Hates Snitches, Tim CHAMPION, April
1994, at 25-26 (noting that prominent defense lawyer Barry Tarlow refused to defend
snitches because to do so was "morally and ethically offensive" and contending that "many
other defense lawyers and even some prosecutors and judges, share that view"); C. Rabon
Martin, Apology For a Veteran Drug Lawyer's No-Flip Policy, THE CHAMPION, March
1995, at 29 (defending his right to refuse to represent snitches).
185 See, eg., James E. Boren, Re: Teresa E. Storch Letter, THE CHAMPION, April 1995, at
50; Teresa E. Storch, Representing Snitches, THE CHAMPION, June 1994, at 31, 48.
186 MODEL Rut. 1.2(a); MODEL CODE DR 7-101(A)(1), EC 7-7, EC 7-8.
187 It is critical that the terms of the relationship be set at the very beginning. Before a
lawyer accepts a fee from a defendant, the client must be fully advised of the standard
tactics and measures that defense counsel will refuse to employ as a matter of principle.
Accordingly, the private lawyer must advise the defendant that she will not assist the client
to "rat" on someone else even though the client may wish to do so, that such a ploy may be
in the client's interest and that other defense lawyers would be willing to render such
assistance. If at that point the client still wishes to retain counsel, then the lawyer has
properly limited the objectives of representation. If a paying client and attorney cannot
agree on the allocation of decisionmaking authority with respect to tactical decisions, the
client is free, of course, to find a lawyer more willing to accept client direction.
This is not to say that a lawyer functions merely as the client's mouthpiece or that
counsel cannot refuse to represent a client for moral or personal reasons. See ABA STAN-
DARDS FOR CRIMNuNA JusTicE 4-3.5, commentary at 162 (3d ed. 1993). In fact, the com-
ment to Model Rule 1.2(c) expressly provides that "[t]he terms upon which representation
is undertaken may exclude specific objectives or means. Such limitations may exclude
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Absent such informed consent, however, defense counsel cannot
unilaterally refuse to seek or even consider a cooperation agreement
because of the lawyer's own philosophy or principles. 188 This is espe-
cially true for the defense lawyer who represents the indigent who has
no opportunity to select counsel.189 Eliminating a potential option for
the defendant without even giving her the opportunity to consider
that option is particularly offensive because the defendant may find
herself sold out by a co-defendant - represented by a defense attor-
ney with a different philosophy - who has cut a deal with the prose-
cutor to testify against the defendant. It is the defendant, not defense
counsel, who ultimately must decide whether cooperation is an alter-
native the client wishes to pursue.' 9°
Counsel's strategic decisions and her efforts to implement those
decisions, therefore, should be consistent with the client's expressed
objectives. The committed defense lawyer will use whatever means
possible - within ethical bounds - to obtain the optimum result for
her client.191 Notwithstanding counsel's best efforts, she may run up
objectives or means that the lawyer regards as repugnant or imprudent." See also Freed-
man, supra note 184, at 26 (agreeing that it is proper for a lawyer to limit representation if
done at the onset of relationship and noting that Barry Tarlow advises his clients of his
philosophy against snitching prior to taking a case).
188 In Smith v. State, 717 P.2d 402 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986), the court found defense
counsel to be ineffective for failing to advise the defendant that he was not legally bound
by a prior "double or nothing" agreement to plead guilty to a second rape case after losing
a first rape trial. The court observed that counsel may have "understandably" felt fore-
closed as a matter of personal integrity and ethics from giving the defendant advice which
would encourage him to renege on the agreement. Yet the court concluded that "the con-
cern of Smith's counsel with his own ethical and moral dilemma was squarely at odds with
his duty to 'conscientiously protect his client's interest, undeflected by conflicting consider-
ations.'" Id. at 406.
189 See Jones v. Barnes, 463, U.S. 745, 757 n.2 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRimNAL JusTicE 4-1.2, commentary at 125 (3d ed. 1993)
(although ethical standards apply equally to retained and appointed counsel, differences in
the nature of the lawyer's employment may affect aspects of the attorney-client
relationship).
190 See AMSTERDAM, supra note 28, § 105 (describing defense counsel's role in assist-
ing the defendant to decide whether to cooperate as involving many of the same considera-
tions as advising the defendant whether to accept a negotiated plea).
191 Although some critics challenge the unbridled partisanship and non-accountability
of the standard concept of the criminal defense lawyer, see, e.g., William H. Simon, The
Ethics of Criminal Defense, 91 MIcH. L. REv. 1703 (1993), most commentators, courts and
practitioners adhere to the view that a "lawyer's professional model is that of zeal: a law-
yer is expected to devote energy, intelligence, skill and personal commitment to the single
goal of furthering the client's interests as those are ultimately defined by the client."
CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL Ermcs 586 (1986). The criminal defense lawyer
"is obligated not to omit any essential lawful and ethical step in the defense" and has the
responsibility of "furthering the defendant's interest to the fullest extent that the law and
the applicable standards of professional conduct permit." ABA STANDARDS FOR CRI-
NAL JusTicE 4-1.2, commentary at 122-23 (3d ed. 1993).
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against a factor over which she has little control. For example, coun-
sel and the prosecutor assigned to the case may have a personality
conflict that started in law school. Although a negotiating strategy is
separate and distinct from a negotiator's personal characteristics, style
and strategy often do get intertwined.192 Yet, as Gifford argues, the
more the lawyer can separate her own personal characteristics from
her negotiating strategy and use competitive, cooperative and integra-
tive tactics, the more effective that lawyer is likely to be.193
Thus, not only should defense counsel try to rise above personal-
ity conflicts, she should adopt a style that works for and is consistent
with her personality. As in trial work, trying to mimic someone else's
style rarely is effective.' 94 Nor is it generally desirable for counsel to
approach every bargaining session in the same way or with one uni-
form style. Rather, defense counsel must settle on an approach that
will be effective with the prosecutor with whom she is bargaining.
Not only must defense counsel have adequately prepared before
structuring a negotiating approach, counsel must be prepared for the
actual bargaining session. Particularly when dealing with a prosecutor
for the first time, defense counsel should demonstrate counsel's keen
familiarity with the facts and the law of the case. This does not mean,
however, that defense counsel should show off. Rarely will this im-
press the prosecutor, especially if the prosecutor is a seasoned vet-
eran. Rather, it means that counsel should have a good command of
the facts and of the client's background so that counsel can respond to
the prosecutor's inquiries and project a confident image. 195 If counsel
fumbles around in her file to determine if the client is presently em-
ployed or how many children the client has, the prosecutor will draw
negative conclusions about counsel's preparation. For the novice law-
yer trying to make a favorable impression, lack of familiarity with
one's fie sends precisely the wrong message.
Both sides may go into a plea bargaining session attempting to
find out more about their opponent's case while bluffing or posturing
about their own case. Of course, neither defense counsel nor the
prosecutor may lie during negotiations. 96 The line between a lie or
192 Gifford, supra note 7, at 47-48. Indeed, Gerald Williams suggests that one's negotiat-
ing approach is likely to be determined largely by one's personality and experience. Wi.-
LiAMS, supra note 128, at 41.
193 Gifford, supra note 7, at 47-48.
194 Craver also recommends that lawyers adopt a negotiating style that suits their per-
sonalities. CRAVER, supra note 74, at 4. In my opinion, however, defense counsel with an
aggressive, confrontational style rarely will benefit from such a style. See supra notes 74-75
and accompanying text.
195 See CRAVER, supra note 74, at 110-11 (stressing that self-assurance is an important
attribute of successful negotiators).
196 Model Code DR 7-102(A)(5) states that "[i]n his representation of a client, a lawyer
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deliberate misrepresentation and bluffing, posturing, puffing or
gamesmanship, however, is not always clear. The Comment to Model
Rule 4.1 reflects this uncertainty by acknowledging that "[u]nder gen-
erally accepted conventions in negotiation, certain types of statements
ordinarily are not taken as statements of material fact.., and a party's
intentions as to an acceptable settlement of a claim are in this cate-
gory." Not surprisingly, then, there is widespread disagreement
among practitioners and scholars as to the kinds of statements and
tactics that are improper. 197
Professor Alschuler claims that prosecutorial "bluffing" is wide-
spread and that prosecutors willingly misrepresent facts to sustain
their bluffs and obtain convictions. 198 On the other hand, the authors
of Plea Bargaining: Critical Issues and Common Practices found little
evidence that prosecutors deliberately misrepresent facts.' 99 Rather,
their research suggests that prosecutors generally agree that such con-
duct in negotiations is improper and unethical. Nonetheless, their re-
search also shows that many prosecutors feel they can legitimately
attempt to bluff defendants into pleading guilty in cases in which the
prosecutor has various weaknesses or proof problems and that they
frequently do so.20 0
In attempting to realistically assess the strength of the state's
case, therefore, counsel must recognize that the prosecutor may be
bluffing about her case.201 Especially when one is dealing with an ad-
versary for the first time, it may be difficult to ascertain if the prosecu-
tor's case is as solid as she represents.2° Defense counsel may want to
shall not... [k]nowingly make a false statement of law or fact." Similarly, Model Rule 4.1
declares that "[i]n the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly... make
a false statement of material fact or law to a third person."
197 See, e.g., PLEA BARGAINING, supra note 5, at 49-60; CRAVER, supra note 74, at 309-
27; James J. White, Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in Negotiation,
1980 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 926.
198 Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CMI. L. REV.
50, 65-68 (1968).
199 PLEA BARGAINING, supra note 5, at 50-60.
200 Id. at 50-60. See also James Zagel, Pleas of Guilty, in PRACTICING LAW INsTrrTE,
FOURTH ANNUAL CRIMINAL ADVOCACY INsTrrTE, WINNING THE CASE BEFoRE TRIAL
63, 75 (1971) (contending that many prosecutors "do not attempt to bluff a plea of guilty
from a guilty defendant against whom [their] case is weak, unless the defendant commits
crimes of violence" and recommending that "bluffing ... be used only in cases where the
interests of society are overwhelming").
201 "[A] careful examination of the behavior of even the most forthright, honest, and
trustworthy negotiators will show them actively engaged in misleading their opponents
about their true position .... To conceal one's true position, to mislead an opponent about
one's true settling point is the essence of negotiation." White, supra note 197, at 927-28.
202 As in poker, the more experience a person has with an adversary, the more one
should be able to read that person's bluffs. For a discussion of the manner in which an
adversary's communication and behavior may reveal information about that adversary, see
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direct specific questions to the prosecutor to force her to reveal
whether, in fact, her critical witnesses are available or whether partic-
ular evidence has been duly analyzed.203 Assuming that the prosecu-
tor will respond truthfully to such inquiries, defense counsel will be in
a better position to successfully resolve the case.2°4 Indeed, the more
defense counsel can develop her skill as a patient, active listener, the
more likely it is that she can induce the prosecutor to disclose even
more information in the negotiating session than the prosecutor
intended.205
It is ill-advised and dangerous for defense counsel to get caught
exaggerating or stretching the truth.206 Again, this is particularly so
when dealing with an adversary for the first time. If defense counsel
asserts that the client has been in the jurisdiction for only a short time
to which the prosecutor responds by noting the defendant's conviction
for drunk driving five years ago in the same county, defense counsel
may find herself in a very difficult position.207 This will, of course,
happen to every defense attorney from time to time because counsel
will be relying, at least in part, on information from a client who may
have lied or been confused about certain facts.208 Nevertheless, de-
CRAVER, supra note 74, at 87-92.
203 See PLEA BARGANING, supra note 5, at 52-60 (urging defense lawyers to ask direct
questions to unmask bluffing and suggesting that prosecutors would respond honestly if
asked); CRAVER, supra note 74, at 80-81 (stressing the advantages of questioning one's
adversary to gain information and to exert control over the negotiating session); FISHER &
URY, supra note 92, at 88 (suggesting that negotiator respond to an offer by asking for an
explanation of the offer).
204 Prosecutors may be willing to respond to certain direct questions, but they may view
the questions as confrontational or competitive bargaining and only respond if defense
counsel is willing to share information about the defense case or respond to the prosecu-
tor's questions. See Zagel, supra note 200, at 76 (urging prosecutors to ask defense counsel
what the defense will be).
205 See CRAVER, supra note 74, at 12.
206 See PLEA BARGAINING, supra note 5, at 52:
A major incentive for not crossing the line between legitimate puffery and outright
deceit is self-interest. An attorney's personal credibility and reputation are at stake.
Credibility is essential for lawyers, particularly in the criminal courts. There seems to
be no middle ground. One is trustworthy or not. Once lost, credibility is hard to
regain. Without it, the practice of law can be considerably more difficult.
Rather than lie, counsel should selectively respond or skillfully avoid answering the prose-
cutor's question in a way that protects critical information without arousing the prosecu-
tor's suspicions or closing off communication. For a discussion of effective avoidance
techniques, see ROBERT M. BAsTREss & JOSEPH D. HARBAUGH, INTERVIEWING, COUN-
SELING AND NEGOTIATING 422-28 (1990).
27 See Glanzer & Taskier, supra note 62, at 8 ("nothing undermines a defense lawyer's
credibility so much as the making of factual or legal assertions that the prosecutor knows
are wrong").
208 Indeed, as any experienced criminal defense lawyer knows, while the client deserves
the benefit of any doubt as well as counsel's non-judgmental attitude, counsel should be
wary of blindly accepting a defendant's assertions of fact as true. See Gary Goodpaster,
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fense counsel should attempt to ensure that lack of familiarity with
her client's case does not add to this problem.
It may not be advisable for defense counsel to seek to resolve a
case in counsel's first meeting with the prosecutor. Although a host of
factors, including the defendant's pretrial detention, financial re-
straints or employment needs as well as the machinations of a co-de-
fendant, may affect the timing of negotiations,2°9 frequently counsel
would be wise to delay any attempt to resolve the case in order to
utilize the first meeting with the prosecutor to discover more about
the state's case.210 The wisdom of such a delay depends on the case
and the context or course of that initial negotiating session. As ex-
plained earlier, the key to effective negotiation not only is determin-
ing what one's specific goals are in any bargaining session and
discussing with the client anticipated responses, but then being able to
respond to changing circumstances as negotiations unfold. Moreover,
even if counsel receives an offer that counsel knows is acceptable to
the client, it may be wise to delay any acceptance of that offer until a
later meeting. Once again, counsel's decision depends on the circum-
stances, including the risk of the offer being withdrawn, and the cli-
ent's wishes.
Usually it is not desirable to have the client actually participate in
the bargaining session. Criminal defense lawyers generally prefer not
to have the client present since the client's facial expressions or re-
marks may undermine counsel's efforts.211 Nevertheless, in rare in-
stances, a properly prepared defendant can be instrumental in
securing a good outcome.212
Many texts on negotiation stress the importance of negotiating on
The Adversary System, Advocacy, and Effective Assistance of Counsel in Criminal Cases, 14
N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 59, 75 (1986) (suggesting that Strickland's assumption
that counsel can take at face value information supplied by the defendant is contrary to the
experience and practice of most criminal defense lawyers).
209 See supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
210 See CRAVER, supra note 74, at 81 (noting that because plea bargaining is a process,
the first meeting often should be used primarily to gather information).
211 This holds true for lawyers negotiating in other contexts as well. See CRAVER, supra
note 74, at 50-51, 239-40.
212 In a number of my own cases, the client's presentation of the underlying events or
personal circumstances was so compelling or so sympathetic that we decided to have the
client participate in the bargaining session. I am convinced that we were able to achieve as
good or even better results in these cases than if I alone had made the same presentation to
the prosecutor. This tactic works because certain clients are able to humanize their story in
a way that is impossible for even the most eloquent defense lawyer to do. See supra note
95 and accompanying text. However, many clients do not perform well in front of skeptical
prosecutors who are likely to respond negatively to the client's mistakes, embellishments
or excuses. Thus, counsel should use this tactic only if she believes that the client, prosecu-
tor and case are such that the tactic is likely to advance the overall negotiating strategy.,
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one's own turf.213 Rarely is this possible in the criminal context. In
the vast majority of cases, negotiations will occur in a courtroom, the
hallway of the courthouse or in the prosecutor's office. The setting as
well as the extent to which the prosecutor is focused on plea bargain-
ing may influence counsel's ability to obtain a favorable result. It may
be desirable to catch the prosecutor in the back of a courtroom and
strike a deal when the prosecutor is not really attentive to the task at
hand. On the other hand, defense counsel must be mindful not to
allow herself to be caught off-guard and to negotiate a case when
counsel is not fully prepared to do so. A skilled negotiator will manip-
ulate the timing of events and the setting to maximize that lawyer's
advantage. Moreover, it is usually best to avoid negotiating under
pressure to make a decision unless counsel is in the best position to
take advantage of that pressure.214
In some cases, it may be desirable to approach the prosecutor
with a proposed bargain rather than wait for the prosecutor to make
an offer. Research suggests that there is a positive correlation be-
tween a negotiator's original demand and her final outcome.215 Thus,
defense counsel may be undercutting herself if her initial settlement
proposal is too reasonable or too modest.216 If defense counsel de-
cides to present an initial settlement proposal, counsel should consider
demanding the most extreme position she can rationally defend. 21 7
On the other hand, if counsel's proposed settlement offer is wholly
unrealistic, the offer may be counterproductive. The prosecutor may
either dismiss counsel as incompetent or inexperienced or respond by
refusing to offer any concessions. 218 The decision to make an initial
proposal and the crafting of that proposal depends, therefore, on
counsel's assessment of the best overall negotiating strategy to employ
in the particular case.
Counsel's overall strategy also dictates the selection of other ne-
gotiating techniques or tactics to use.219 Because in most cases the
prosecutor wields superior bargaining power, defense counsel gener-
ally will be attempting to utilize persuasive arguments, rather than
213 See, e.g., CRAVER, supra note 74, at 65-67; FISHER & URY, supra note 92, at 135.
214 See FISHER & URY, supra note 92, at 124 ("a good negotiator rarely makes an impor-
tant decision on the spot").
215 Gifford, supra note 7, at 49.
216 See CRAVER, supra note 74, at 55-57.
217 See CRAVER, supra note 74, at 56 ("proficient negotiators generally attempt to de-
velop the most extreme positions they can rationally defend").
. 218 Accord s. SIEGEL & L. FOURAKER, BARGAINING AND GROUP DECISION-MAKING:
EXPERIMENTs IN BILATERAL MONOPOLY 93 (1960). In my experience, I also have found
this to be the case.
. 219 For a description of negotiation tactics and techniques applicable in a wide range of
contexts, see CRAVER, supra note 74, at 124-45.
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threats, to gain concessions from the prosecutor.220 Counsel's ability
to strike a responsive chord with an innovative or emotional presenta-
tion may succeed in moving a cynical prosecutor to offer a more
favorable bargain.- 1
In other instances, defense counsel's ability to extract a reason-
able offer or settlement turns on counsel's success in convincing the
prosecutor that the defense actually is willing to go to trial. In a sub-
stantial number of cases, the threat to go to trial is hollow and has
little impact on the prosecutor.222 In some cases, however, defense
counsel's confident insistence that she really has no alternative but to
try the case may cause the prosecutor eventually to offer a settlement
that is more favorable to the defense than the case really warrants.22 3
Defense counsel's reputation and skill as a trial lawyer - combined
with a demonstrated willingness to go to trial if necessary - often is
the key to success as a negotiator. Indeed, if counsel is able to con-
vince the prosecutor that a trial will be a costly, hard-fought battle, the
prosecutor may conclude that even though he or she will win in the
end, the victory may not be worth the effort expended.- 4
Although occasionally counsel's candid assessment that she is
looking to resolve the case may be a useful step in securing a reason-
able outcome, it may also signal to a prosecutor that the defense is
simply unwilling to go to trial.225 For some prosecutors, this knowl-
220 Defense counsel may succeed in securing a better bargain if she is able to persuade
the prosecutor that they share interests - to avoid the conviction of an innocent person, to
get the defendant help, to eliminate the need for a messy trial, to arrive at a fair resolution
- which will encourage more cooperative bargaining on the prosecutor's part. See FISHER
& URY, supra note 92, at 70-76.
221 See CRAVER, supra note 74, at 128, 134 (noting the impact of persuasive, emotion
arguments).
222 An idle threat at best has no effect and at worst may cut off negotiations. See GARY
BELLow & BEA MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS: MATERIALS FOR CLINICAL IN-
STRUCTION IN ADVOCACY 529 (1978); Lowenthal, supra note 129, at 86.
223 See CRAVER, supra note 74, at 243, 248 (recognizing that a skilled negotiator may
undermine a stronger opponent's confidence by effectively denying the existence of the
other side's superior strength or by convincingly adopting an inflexible position that causes
the other side "to blink"). In fact, counsel's refusal to blink and continued preparation for
trial may be the only way to move a tough-minded, stubborn prosecutor to offer a better
bargain. Counsel's ability to pursue this approach, however, turns on the willingness of the
client to resist the pressure to cave in and on the potential downside of a trial. See FISHER
& URY, supra note 92, at 98-128 (discussing the importance of developing a best alterna-
tive to a negotiated agreement as a standard to measure proposed agreements so counsel
does not become too committed to reaching an agreement).
224 This point is repeatedly made in the literature. See, e.g., PLEA BARGAINING, supra
note 5, at 68; CRAVER, supra note 74, at 65; White, supra note 26, at 369-70; Gerstein,
supra note 144, at 57.
225 If the prosecutor is a competitive bargainer - as I believe most are - she may see
counsel's cooperative attitude as a sign of weakness and refuse to grant any reciprocal
concessions. Indeed, empirical evidence demonstrates that a lawyer using a cooperative
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edge allows them to drive a particularly harsh bargain. Defense coun-
sel who clearly signals an unwillingness to go to trial may find herself
at the mercy of the prosecutor. 226 Asking for mercy is rarely the ap-
proach of choice. Rather, counsel must ensure that her cooperative
gestures are seen as principled concessions to reach a fair bargain, not
a sign of weakness, anxiety or fear.227
In cases in which the defense has substantial leverage, counsel
should give the prosecutor an opportunity to save face if possible.22s
Emphasizing in a bargaining session the existence of facts not known
to the prosecutor's office when the initial charging decision was made
permits the prosecutor to utilize those facts to dismiss the case. Thus,
even though the initial charging decision may have been a horrendous
one, the second prosecutor is able to justify the dismissal without tak-
ing a slap at a fellow prosecutor.
In other instances, however, defense counsel may have the lever-
age to insist upon a dismissal or favorable bargain that is hard for a
prosecutor or prosecutor's office to swallow. Although the prosecutor
may lack leverage in this particular instance, he or she may pressure
defense counsel to enter into a reasonable plea bargain so as to not
embarrass or cause a political problem for the prosecutor's office.229
approach is vulnerable to exploitation by a competitive negotiator. Lowenthal, supra note
129, at 83-88; WnLIAMs, supra note 128, at 48-49. See also Gifford, supra note 7, at 79-82
(arguing that generally defense lawyers should begin with competitive tactics because pros-
ecutors generally start out competitively but concluding that defense counsel should shift
to a more cooperative approach because prosecutors generally adopt a cooperative strat-
egy). Although I have dealt with prosecutors who were cooperative bargainers, I do not
agree with Gifford that most prosecutors "become predominately cooperative" primarily
because of the prosecutor's unique role as a "minister of justice." Id. at 75.
226 See CRAVER, supra note 74, at 218-19; DERSHOWrrz, supra note 19, at 415.
227 See, CRAVER supra note 74, at 113-24. For an extended discussion of the strategy of
"principled negotiation," see FIsHER & URY, supra note 92.
228 See CRAVER, supra note 73, at 248-49 (acknowledging importance of face-saving
gestures in other bargaining contexts). I disagree, however, with Gifford's suggestion that
an appropriate device for allowing the prosecutor to save face and thereby "still main-
tain[ing] a cordial personal working relationship with the prosecutor" is to paint the client
as "obstreperous" and to attribute to him or her "the responsibility for [counsel's use of]
competitive tactics, such as refusing to enter pleas or raising certain defenses." See Gif-
ford, supra note 7, at 81. I agree it is important to foster a good relationship with prosecu-
tors, but it should not be necessary, nor is it generally appropriate, to do so at the expense
of a client. Accord DERSHowrrz, supra note 19, at 405, 414 (noting that while the tempta-
tion to sacrifice individual clients to maintain a reputation for moderation or integrity may
become "overwhelming," defense counsel must be certain he or she is interested "only in
achieving the best legal result for the client and not in serving some other personal or
professional interest").
229 Craver argues that a lawyer who is going to be involved in future dealing with an
adversary should not use tactics that might be fruitful in the instant case if the lawyer has a
reasonable fear that such actions might have negative future consequences. CRAVER,
supra note 74, at 25. Although Craver goes on to state that a client does not have the right
to expect his lawyer "to employ disreputable tactics" - and I agree - I strongly disagree
Fall 1995]
HeinOnline  -- 2 Clinical L. Rev. 129 1995-1996
CLINICAL LAW REVIEW
The pressure on defense counsel may be intense, particularly if com-
bined with a veiled threat by the prosecutor to keep this case in mind
in future negotiating sessions. Unquestionably, defense counsel will
be called upon to make tough choices. Nevertheless, because counsel
represents an individual defendant, not a particular cause or future
clients, she is obligated to secure the best result possible for a client
even though it may negatively impact future clients.
IV. AFTER THE Music HAS STOPPED: LEARNING FROM ONE'S
NEGOTIATING EXPERIENCE
Defense counsel cannot unilaterally accept or reject a prosecu-
tor's settlement offer. Rather, counsel must fully discuss with her cli-
ent any settlement offer made by the prosecutor even if counsel
believes that the prosecutor's settlement offer is unacceptable or not
in the client's best interests.230 Counsel must provide sufficient ad-
vice, including a realistic assessment of the probable outcome if the
plea bargain is rejected and the case tried, so that the client can make
an informed decision.231 It is then up to the client to make the deci-
sion whether to accept or to reject the offer.232
ABA Standard 4-5.1 calls for the defense lawyer to "advise the
accused with complete candor concerning all aspects of the case, in-
cluding a candid estimate of the probable outcome," but cautions
counsel "not to intentionally understate or overstate the risks,
hazards, or prospects of the case to exert undue influence on the ac-
cused's decision as to his or her plea." As all experienced lawyers
know, the manner in which the pros and cons of a plea bargain or any
settlement offer are communicated to a client shapes the ultimate de-
cision. It is critical, therefore, that defense counsel be mindful of the
systemic pressures described in this article when counseling a client
regarding a proposed plea bargain.
For example, many defendants, especially first offenders, are re-
luctant to go to trial if exercising that option raises the possibility of a
jail sentence. For many defendants, the prospect of going to jail is so
unnerving that they will agree to almost anything if the negotiated
disposition guarantees that the defendant will not serve any jail
time.233 When explaining options to a client, therefore, defense coun-
with his suggestion that a lawyer should bypass a short-term gain for a present client if it
would be at the expense of prospective clients. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying
text.
M See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
231 See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRDNAL JusT cE 4-5.1 (3d ed. 1993); MODEL RULE 1.4.
See also supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
232 See supra note 79.
233 See supra note 63.
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sel should avoid unduly emphasizing the risks of incarceration.
Although the lawyer must advise the client of the likely adverse con-
sequences of a proposed course of action, she should do so in a way
that does not cause the client to fixate on the small risk of incarcera-
tion. Like the doctor who overplays the small risk of an adverse side
effect, thereby causing the patient to reject a very safe medical proce-
dure, the lawyer who unnecessarily focuses the client's attention on
the risk of jail may discourage the client from pursuing an alternative
that really is in the client's best interest.
It is improper for counsel to allow her own needs or interests to
affect her presentation of the client's options. If counsel feels strongly
that the client's best interests will be served by selecting a particular
option, she may use "reasonable persuasion to guide the client to a
sound decision." Sometimes that means counsel should encourage
the defendant to go to trial. But it also means in some cases that
counsel should urge the defendant to accept a plea bargain even
though it entails a long prison stint rather than taking a hopeless case
to trial. The line between "reasonable persuasion" and manipulation
which robs the client of the right to make one's own decisions is, how-
ever, not a bright one. Indeed, as Albert Alschuler has accurately de-
scribed, the defense lawyer's task is often incredibly difficult:
When a lawyer refuses to "coerce his client," he insures his own
failure; the foreseeable result is usually a serious and unnecessary
penalty that, somehow, it should have been the lawyer's duty to pre-
vent. When a lawyer does "coerce his client," however, he also in-
sures his failure; he damages the attorney-client relationship,
confirms the cynical suspicions of the client, undercuts a constitu-
tional right, and incurs the resentment of the person whom he seeks
to serve.235
So once again, defense counsel finds herself in a difficult bind. It
is appropriate to lean on clients to keep them from making poor deci-
sions regarding plea bargains. In my view, how hard counsel can lean
turns on the seriousness of the case, the harm facing the defendant,
the client's ability to make informed decisions, the certainty of the
harm, the client's rationale for his or her decision and the means used
to change the defendant's mind.236 Defense counsel generally should
not be permitted to threaten to withdraw to coerce a defendant into
accepting a plea bargain that counsel feels is in the client's best inter-
234 ABA STANDARDS FOR CuN'uAL JusrICE 4-5.1, commentary at 198 (3d ed. 1993).
235 The Defense Attorney's Role, supra note 16, at 1310.
236 A full exploration of the issue of how far and under what circumstances defense
counsel can go to pressure the client, however, requires a separate article. For an interest-
ing essay that explores this issue but outside of the criminal context, see William H. Simon,
Lawyer Advice and Client Autonomy: Mrs. Jones's Case, 50 MD. L. REv. 213 (1991).
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est.237 Rather, defense counsel ultimately must respect the individ-
ual's constitutional right to turn down a plea bargain and to go to trial,
even if that choice is foolhardy.238 Nevertheless, it may be very diffi-
cult for counsel to respect a foolish decision which harms her client,
especially for the lawyer defending an accused facing the death
penalty.239
If the defendant decides to accept an offer, it is important for
defense counsel to reduce the agreement to writing to avoid misun-
derstandings. 24° Given the volume of cases in most prosecutor's of-
fices, it is particularly important to memorialize the agreement if
counsel anticipates that the prosecutor with whom counsel struck the
plea bargain may not be in court at the time the guilty plea is entered
or she foresees possible confusion about the details of the bargain. A
simple confirmation letter to the prosecutor often will be sufficient. In
some instances, a more detailed written document is appropriate. 241
A final step that a lawyer should take at the conclusion of a nego-
tiation - for her own sake as well as that of future clients - is to
reflect upon the experience and carefully assess what strategies or
techniques were effective. Too many lawyers complete a plea bargain-
ing session without stopping to consider what worked and what did
not, never thinking about what could have been done differently. As
a result, too many lawyers repeat their mistakes and do not even rec-
ognize their limitations. Growth and improvement as a negotiator,
237 See The Defense Attorney's Role, supra note 16, at 1310; AMSTERDAM, supra note 28,
§ 201. But see Uresti v. Lynaugh, 821 F.2d 1099, 1102 (5th Cir. 1987) (stating that defense
counsel has the right to ask the court for permission to withdraw if the client refuses to
plead guilty and insists on going to trial when counsel feels the choice is "foolhardy"); State
v. Schweitzer, 1992 WL 142274, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 1992), rev. denied, 490
N.W.2d 24 (Wis. 1992) ("when an attorney decides that a defendant should plead guilty
under a plea agreement and that to go to trial is foolhardy, the attorney, without question,
has the right to seek withdrawal as counsel if the defendant refuses to plead guilty"). It is
difficult to square such decisions with the defendant's right to choose to go to trial and the
ethical command of Model Rule 1.2.
238 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975) (Brennan J., concurring).
239 Defense counsel who is a client-centered decisionmaker confronts her most difficult
challenge in a capital case when her client insists on turning down a plea bargain that will
save his or her life. For a further discussion of the difficulty of deciding how much pressure
to bring to bear on the capital defendant who is turning down a plea bargain counsel feels
is in the client's interest, see White, supra note 26, at 371-74.
240 See Glanzer & Taskier, supra note 62, at 42.
241 Care must be taken to ensure that the written agreement accurately reflects the ac-
tual agreement. Courts disagree whether prior oral understandings can be considered in
resolving a dispute about the meaning of a written agreement. Compare In re Arnett, 804
F.2d 1200, 1203 (11th Cir. 1986) (written agreement should be viewed in the context of
negotiations and ought not be interpreted to contradict specific oral understanding) with
Hartman v. Blankenship, 825 F.2d 26,29 (4th Cir. 1987) (contract principles bar considera-
tion of testimony of oral understanding prior to a written agreement if that agreement was
meant to contain the final bargain).
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indeed as a lawyer, comes from learning to extract from one's per-
formances and experiences lessons which can be applied in the fu-
ture.242 Law schools historically have not done an adequate job
preparing law students to be reflective practitioners.243 Although
most law schools have improved their skills instruction in recent years,
many lawyers now in practice were never taught the skill of systemati-
cally critiquing or evaluating their own work. Not surprisingly, then,
many lawyers have not cultivated this important skill.
The good lawyer will review and evaluate her preparation, her
strategy and the negotiation session with an eye toward future negoti-
ations.2" Good lawyers learn from both their successes and their fail-
ures. But the speed and extent of the lawyer's development as a
proficient negotiator usually will be a function of her reflective abili-
ties.245 The following checklist is provided as a starting point for those
interested in acquiring or honing this skill:
POST-PLEA BARGAIN CHECKLIST 246
1. How good was your:
a) overall pre-negotiation preparation?
b) knowledge of law relating to the case?
c) knowledge of facts?
d) knowledge of defendant's personal characteristics?
e) knowledge of defendant's expectations and concerns, especially po-
tential collateral consequences?
2. Did you select a particular negotiating strategy and why?
3. Did you and your client select a certain goal?
Did you achieve that goal?
Did you set a high enough goal?
If you achieved everything you sought, is there reason to believe that
your goal was set too low?
4. Did you discover at any time in the negotiation process that any of your
pre-negotiation assessment was inaccurate?
5. Did you pick up information during the negotiating process which aided
242 See ABA SECTION ON LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS To THE BAR, LEGAL
EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT - AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM (RE-
PORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE
GAP) 218-20 (1992).
243 Id at 233-44. For an excellent discussion of the importance of becoming a reflective
professional, see DONALD A. SCHON, EDUCATING THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER (1987)
and THE REFIECrIVE PRACTITIONER (1983).
244 See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE - AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CoMMITrEE ON
CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO ACHIEVING EXCEL-
LENCE IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW: STANDARDS, METHOD AND SELF-EvALUATION (1992).
245 See CRAVER, supra note 74, at 207-14.
246 This is a modified version of a post-negotiation checklist suggested by CRAVER,
supra note 74, at 212-14.
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you?
Could you have done anything during the process to learn more about
the prosecutor's strategy, goals or the merits of the state's case?
6. Did you or the prosecutor make any unintended verbal or nonverbal
disclosures?
If so, what prompted those disclosures?
7. Did any contextual factor such as time or location affect the negotia-
tion? If so, could you have influenced that factor?
8. Who made the first offer and what prompted it?
9. Who reacted to the first offer and in what manner?
10. Did the prosecutor employ any specific bargaining tactics or
techniques?
If so, how did you react to those tactics?
11. How did the prosecutor react to any techniques you used?
12. Were there other tactics which you might have been able to use to ad-
vance your position?
13. Which party made the first concession and how was it handled?
14. If subsequent concessions were made, were they reciprocated? If not,
why not?
Were the concessions "principled" and if so, what did either party
articulate?
15. How was the plea bargain finalized?
Did either side appear to make greater concessions in wrapping up the
bargain?
16. Did each side initially bargain competitively? If not, which side did
not?
Did either party switch to a cooperative/integrative approach? If so,
which party and why?
Were both parties bargaining cooperatively at the end? If not, why not?
17. Did time pressures influence either side or the concessions made? If so,
could you have used this factor to your advantage?
18. Did you "bluff"? If so, how?
Do you think the prosecutor "bluffed"? If so, how?
Is there anything you could have done to unmask the "bluff"?
19. Did you resort to any misrepresentation of fact or law?
Is there any reason to suspect that the prosecutor may have?
20. Who do you think got the more favorable plea bargain and why?
Is there anything else you could have done to achieve a more favorable
outcome for your client?
CONCLUSION
Unquestionably, the criminal defense lawyer has an obligation to
try to secure the best possible result for each client counsel represents.
For the vast majority of clients in criminal cases, defense counsel's
task will be to obtain the best plea bargain possible. The lawyer com-
mitted to providing quality representation, therefore, must learn to be
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an effective negotiator. Effective negotiating, like good card playing,
requires sound judgment, intuition, the ability to read the other play-
ers and the flexibility to adapt to a changing context. And like success
in cards, success in negotiations depends in part on luck but more on
preparation, study and reflective decisionmaking. In the end, the de-
fense lawyer who takes the time to prepare and then to tailor an indi-
vidualized approach is more likely to obtain desirable plea bargains.
Finally, the criminal practitioner who takes the time after each
plea bargaining session to carefully analyze that session in an effort to
determine what worked or did not work and the reasons for her suc-
cess or failure is likely to improve as an negotiator. Finding the time
to be reflective is not easy. And, as with most things in life, becoming
a good negotiator takes hard work. In the end, however, that time
and effort will pay enormous dividends for the criminal defense law-
yer and her clients.
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